


## bulletin

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# *The Department of State* bulletin

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## An Estimate of the Present World Situation

By Secretary Acheson<sup>1</sup>

Ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure to be with you this afternoon. It is particularly pleasant since it gives me the opportunity to thank all of you who gave so generously of your time and efforts, both working here at home and through the special panel which went abroad, to help us on our overseas information service. You did a tremendous job for us and we are very deeply grateful.

This afternoon I am going to try something of an experiment. I am asked to speak with you on what is called "The Present World Situation." Now that is something of a problem, because I have also asked my associates who are dealing with the various geographical portions of our work to come and tell you in some detail about it, and I do not want to anticipate what they are going to say. Therefore I thought we might spend a little time on trying to discover what the present situation is; and, if we can get that in our minds, then perhaps some of the things that my associates say to you may have a little more meaning.

There are several preliminary observations I would like to make about the present situation. One of them is that it is not a situation clouded in obscurity. There is a blinding light thrown upon it—in fact, so much light that the question arises whether the light is not too strong and too multi-colored for reading purposes. I have had a few figures collected for me on some of the contributions to knowledge on this subject which are being put out by Government and by you, who are sitting here. My own Department, the State Department, puts out each year 1,200 press releases dealing with the present international situation. Every day we put out 320,000 words over all channels of the Voice of America. Every day we put out 40,000 words through the five *Wireless Bulletins* which we send to all parts of the world. Each year we put out 20 publications in the field of documenta-

tion of diplomacy, each one of these volumes containing from 100 to 1,500 pages. We put out 70 volumes a year in the field of current information, running from 100 to 500 pages. We put out 200 volumes a year, each running from 20 to 500 pages, on treaties and international actions.

The ECA, the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the Federal Reserve Board probably put out together some three times as much as we do on the international situation.

The Congress has made this one of its main subjects of interest, and you have with you this afternoon the two leading contributors to a Congressional work of 2 million words on Far Eastern policy. I think I led with 418,000 words and General Bradley came a poor second with 278,000!

Outside of the governmental field, there are 500 books a year printed on international affairs and the present international situation, and there are 3,000 magazine articles a year which are sufficiently important for bibliographical listings. Of course I cannot even begin to estimate the number of words put out in the news columns and the editorials.

So you see there is plenty of light being thrown on the present international situation. As I say, the light may be too strong, and it may be too varied for reading, but the situation certainly is not developing in gloom.

There are three things that I would like to talk with you about for a moment in the light of all these volumes of words I have talked about. I have had some 20 or 30 important monographs in the Library of Congress examined from three points of view. One was to find out when the writers of these monographs thought the present situation began. When is "present", in other words? The second thing was, what do these authors, these writers of these important monographs, believe to be the common characteristic, or what is the outstanding characteristic, of the present, as distinct from the past or the future? The third was, what are the essential steps recommended for dealing with the present?

<sup>1</sup> A stenographic transcript of remarks made off the record and from notes to a group of magazine and book publishers on June 29 and released to the press on July 15.



## The Problem of the Present

You will be interested to know some of the results of this inquiry. Let's take first of all when the present situation began. When is "present"? One writer says the present situation began in 1905 with Japanese victory over the Russians in the Russo-Japanese war. Another writer says it began with the conference at Yalta. Another says it began with General Marshall's mission to China in 1945-46. Another says it began with the invention of the airplane. Another says it began with the great upsurge of population which took place when modern medicine checked the death rate of the last century. Another one, who is not quite so modern, says it began with the Protestant Reformation. Another says it began with the collective action taken against aggression in Korea. Another, a medievalist, says it began with the Portuguese exploring the Senegal River 500 years ago. Another says the "present" began with the dropping of the atom bomb.

The main point in common that we can find in all these writings is that the present is upon us now. All we can say is what the little boy said to the little girl when he was looking over the fence and she was on the sidewalk. She asked, "Are you going to Mary Brown's party?" and he answered, "I am to it." All we know is that we are in the present, but when it began we cannot tell. We can say that there is no one moment when it began. We can say that there will probably be no one moment when it will end. But it is with us. Human experience is not like a book; it is not written in chapters.

The next thing that I had examined was, what is the fundamental quality of the present? How do you tell the present? How do you know something is present and is not characteristic of the past? Going through these monographs, we come upon these theories. One is that the fundamental quality of the present situation is that it is a contention between great powers over the control of territory and that in this contention between great powers ideological differences not only are secondary but really obscure the real meaning of the present time. Another writer says that the fundamental characteristic of the present is that it is a conflict between ideologies and that the old conflicts of states about territory have nothing to do with the present. Another says that it is fundamentally a struggle between the rule of law, imposed in the classic conception of the state, and a conspiracy, on the other hand, which is the revolt of men against the state. Another says that it is the struggle between the awakened peoples of Asia and the decadent peoples of the West. Another says that the fundamental quality of the present situation is that nations have tended to renounce the healthy interest in national self-interest and have run off after the will-o'-the-wisp of collective security. Another one says that the quality of the present is that nations have not re-

nounced their interests in national security and have failed to set up collective security in a world commonwealth.

All that we get out of these analyses of the quality of the present is that struggle is at the heart of the times in which we live, that the times in which we live are onerous, but that there is hope for mankind if we will keep our minds on the heart of the problem.

When we come to look for the heart of the problem, we find it somewhat confusing. It reminds me of some words in the introduction of Henry Nevins's book, *Changes and Chances*—you remember that is the first of three volumes in his autobiography. He was a wonderful man, whom many of you I am sure knew while he was alive. He was a great war correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*. In his book he discussed one of the prayers in the *Book of Common Prayer*. The words I refer to are:

That so, among the sundry and manifold changes of the world, our hearts may surely there be fixed where true joys are to be found.

Nevins said that he always thought the writer of that prayer was slightly naive, because, if one only knew what the true joys were, it would be no difficulty to keep one's heart fully fixed upon them. If we only knew what the heart of the problem was at the present time, it would not be difficult to keep our minds on it.

## The Necessary Line of Action

Now we come to the third thing that I asked to have looked up in these monographs—what is the line of action necessary to deal with the present situation? One writer says that we must recognize that what we are involved in is the struggle for the minds of men and that we must spend vastly more money on that and not waste our funds on economic or military expenditures. Another one says that the minds of men are trivial things at best, and that the minds of men follow their stomachs and, therefore, the thing to do is to concentrate on economic activities, and intellectual and ideological results will follow. Another writer says military power is the only thing that counts in our time—forget all this nonsense about propaganda and economics and concentrate on the military problem. Another one says that the real heart of the matter is a struggle for power as based upon position and therefore what we must do to settle the contention of our times is to come to agreement dividing the world into power areas. Another one says that the heart of the matter is to get away from the outmoded ideas of national sovereignty and go in for world government so that all differences between nations will be mere partisan friction, and war, if there ever is any war, will become merely small civil disturbances.

Summing up all of this, what you get out of the people who are writing most seriously about



our time is that there is no sovereign remedy; that there is no one course to pursue; that there are many courses, many attitudes, which we must take. I think this is a rather long-winded way of coming to a conclusion which all of you recognize is inherently sensible, that there is not any one characteristic of our time, there is not any one answer to it. It has many characteristics and there must be many answers to it.

I venture to put down here some of the attitudes which seem to me essential for us to have in mind as we struggle with the times in which we live.

The first attitude which seems to me essential is the recognition that, whenever the present began and whenever the present will end, it will be with us for a very long time. If we will get that firmly in mind, we will begin to get over the impatience which leads people to try to find magic solutions. If we will recognize that we have before us a long period of work, then we have the beginning of wisdom. Once we understand that we have a long period of work before us then we can see that the object of our efforts is not to remove these problems. They are not removable. The object of our work is to reduce these problems to manageable proportions.

#### **A Sense of Continuing Responsibility**

If we can reduce them to manageable proportions, and if we will then accept continuity of responsibility in managing those problems, we begin to see some daylight ahead. But we cannot for a moment believe, if we are really sensible in facing the present, that the problems can be escaped. We must believe over and over again, and understand over and over again—as though we heard them for the first time—Lincoln's great words in his message to Congress of December 1862: "We cannot escape history." We cannot escape the problem of the present. We can only escape it by death or defeat. If we are going to deal with those problems, we must be willing to deal with them for a long time. We must be willing to reduce them from almost impossible problems to manageable problems, and we must have a sense of continuing responsibility in dealing with them.

The second very important attitude for us to take in dealing with the problems of the present is to avoid overdramatizing any particular problem or overemphasizing it. That is always our danger not peculiar to the United States but common to everybody. The particular problem with which we are dealing seems to us to be the overwhelming problem of all time. Take Korea, for instance, which God knows is important enough. There is a phrase which has been applied to it which is typical of this attitude which I am urging you to avoid. The activities of the U. N. in Korea have been described as "the reluctant crusade." That phrase seems to connote that Korea is the place where the showdown be-

tween the East and West is going to occur. "The reluctant crusade"—reluctantly the East and West get into the showdown. Now if anything is important, if anything is true about the situation in Korea, it is the overwhelming importance of *not* forcing a showdown on our side in Korea and *not* permitting our opponents to force a showdown.

That has been the whole heart and essence of the policy which the Administration has been following and which General Marshall and General Bradley so brilliantly described in the hearings before the Joint Committee. Korea's significance is not the final crusade. It is not finally making valid the idea of collective security. It is important perhaps for the inverse reason that in Korea we prevented the invalidation of collective security.

Collective security is not something which is established once and for all by some dramatic gesture. Collective security is like a bank account. It is kept alive by the resources which are put into it. In Korea the Russians presented a check which was drawn on the bank account of collective security. The Russians thought the check would bounce. They thought it was a bad check. But to their great surprise, the teller paid it. The important thing was that the check was paid. The importance will be nothing if the next check is not paid and if the bank account is not kept strong and sufficient to cover all checks which are drawn upon it.

The third attitude which I think is important for us to have in mind is a proper sense of proportion about the problems and difficulties which come before us.

In getting the proper sense of proportion about our difficulties, the first thing that we must do is to understand that the present situation is a great deal more serious than the United States as a whole has yet come to realize. We must understand that the Soviet Union is a much tougher adversary than the United States has yet realized. We must not only understand that, but we must understand something else, and that is that the Soviet Union is not the only difficulty that we have. Behind and beyond the Soviet Union, and our problems with the Soviet Union, lie other difficulties, perhaps even greater. The important thing about our actions in the present is that we must so act in dealing with the immediate difficulty that we manage also the more long-range ones.

What do I mean by those general words? Twice in our lifetime we have dealt with problems before us as though the solution of the problems was the solution of all problems. We dealt with the Kaiser as though the defeat of the Kaiser was the defeat of all such menace to the world. And yet there immediately grew up after that Hitler and Tojo. Then we dealt with Hitler and Tojo, and then we found looming behind them Stalin and the menace of communism and the Soviet Union.

Now what lies behind the Soviet Union? I see two problems. I am not saying these are caused by the Soviet Union, but I am saying that here are problems which we must reduce to manageable proportion in our dealing with the present. One is the awakening of the vast populations of Asia, populations which are beginning to feel that they should have and should exercise in the world an influence which is proportionate to their numbers and worthy of their cultures. The force is a force which can be turned to good, or it can be a force which can rend to pieces a world which has imprudently managed its immediate problem and which finds itself weakened, perhaps shattered in facing these upsurging forces of Asia. Therefore, in thinking about the Soviet Union, we must think about this shadow on the rock behind it. We must manage our difficulties so prudently that we have strength and initiative and power left to help shape and guide these emerging forces so that they will not turn out to be forces which rend and destroy.

In addition to the emergence of these peoples of Asia with the ambitions and possible power—which has to be thought about in relation not only to the existing power but also to the power which might be left after some imprudently inaugurated struggle had torn the Western world apart—there are the great problems of the world's growing hunger, of its growing numbers, of its deficient knowledge of the very elemental methods of staying alive.

These are the problems, these are the shadows on the rock behind the Soviet Union, of which we must never lose sight. All of this has to do with getting the proper perspective on the difficulties before us.

#### **Balance Between Commitment and Capabilities**

Another attitude which we must always keep in mind is the need to match our strength with the interests which we must defend. We hear it said—and it is wisely said—that there must be a balancing of commitments and capabilities. Too often people say that when they mean that we should reduce our commitments to meet whatever our capabilities may be at any time. Nothing could be more erroneous than that. What we must do is to be conscious of our national interests. A commitment is a national vital interest of which we have become conscious and for which we have made provision, but we may have national interests, which are just as valid, of which we have not become conscious and for which we have not made provision—about which we should immediately become conscious and about which we should immediately make provision.

Another attitude which we must have in mind is that there is no unitary approach. I suggested this a moment ago when I talked about cures which have been put forward for our modern evils. To

think that there is a unitary approach is a fallacy. We must use all means at our hand, whatever they are, and not say that one is the answer, or one or two are the answers. If you take, for instance, the views of those who urge that propaganda is the sole necessary weapon to survive and win in the modern world, you easily find yourself in the ridiculous position where you may have all the people of a nation on your side, but those people are politically organized as an effective opposition to you. To a very large extent—not completely, but to a very large extent—that is the situation which exists in China. I believe that the vast masses of the people in China are sympathetic to the United States, and yet those masses of people in China are organized effectively against us so that they are a very strong opponent. So propaganda is not the sole answer. It is an important weapon, and we must use it—we must use it fully but it is not the sole answer.

Neither is dealing with governments alone the sole answer. The idea that we can make arrangements with this, that, or the other government, without regard to popular support founded on free consent would all too probably involve us in excessively brittle alliances. We have a very good illustration of that sort of brittleness in the arrangements which were made between Hitler and Mussolini; they seemed very fine but they were very brittle, and when the pressure was put upon them they broke down. As it turned out, not the nation but only their passing masters proved to be the parties to the alliance.

We must be aware of both the fallacy of recovery without defensive strength and the fallacy of military strength upon a shaky economic foundation. These two things are of vital importance. They go together and they are at the heart of our efforts at the present time in the North Atlantic Treaty countries. There you have a community, an important community, a virile one, one which has come through grave and deep economic troubles and has been fighting its way up for some time.

Economic well being is not enough by itself. The countries which we have aided along the upward road now see that the situation demands a tremendous effort to build up, along with us, military strength as well as economic strength. Defensive strength is as integral to recovery as a fence is to a cornfield. Yet in seeking to replenish military strength it is necessary to avoid putting too great a load on our allies or on ourselves, for that matter.

There must be a very carefully worked out balance between the firm economic foundation and the strong military defense so that the military defense does not bring down the economic structure in ruins and so that the economic structure is built up for the purpose of defending itself with its military components.



## No Substitute for Central Strength

We must also recognize that there is no substitute for strength at the center. Alliances are important. It is of vital importance to us that our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty and in the Rio treaty be strong and that the bonds between them and us be strong. But it is equally important, if not more important, that there be strength at the center of these groups—the strength of the United States, its economic strength, its military strength, which will, in itself, breed strength at the periphery of our associations. The same applies in the United Nations. In that union of nations there is no substitute for the strength of the United States at the heart of the great group of powers which share our determination to uphold the principles of the Charter.

In building that strength it is very important that we should not underestimate ourselves. We have to meet and face limitations and difficulties. But if every time a difficulty comes along somebody says, "Oh, to do that will wreck the economy of the United States," that is underestimating ourselves. I have no doubt that there is a point beyond which the United States cannot go, but I am equally sure that we are not anywhere near that point. Therefore the thing to do is not to be timid about ourselves but to realize that our great strength is there to be used, and to use it wisely and economically and sensibly to create the defenses which we need.

May I say right here in connection with this business of creating strength at the center, we must not for one second allow any development which may occur in Korea to lull us into a belief that now we have turned the corner, and now things are going to get better, and therefore we do not need to make the effort which we have been making. I think we need to make it even more than we made it before. If it is possible to bring about an end of the fighting in Korea, it will be because of the efforts which we have already made and the sacrifices of the men in Korea. The success of our policy will mean only one thing, and that is that we have held off this conspiracy against us and that we have some time now which, if used wisely, will give us the power and give us the union with powerful allies which can deter World War III. If we do not do that, if we allow ourselves to be lulled by Korea, I can assure you that, just as certainly as you are sitting here, we will be hit within the next 6 months to a year with a much tougher blow somewhere else. If we do not make the efforts now, we will be unprepared for that blow. We may completely deter it if we now all bend together every effort we can to going forward with the program.

Another point is that we must believe that time is on our side. I concede to you that in saying this there is an element of faith. There is an

element of faith because I believe that we are people who act. Time is not on our side if we merely sit in the shade and fan ourselves. Time is on our side if we go to work. We can do much in time. We can strengthen ourselves, we can strengthen our allies. We have a vast productive power which is now not harnessed, much greater than those opposed to us. We can harness it. There is much we can do and, if we will do it, time is on our side. If we don't do it, it is not.

Therefore, we come to the matter of will. We have a strong geographical position. We have people who are skilled in industry, who have courage, who make fine soldiers and producers. We have natural resources. We have the productive plant. All of those things are no good at all unless they are cemented together and thrown into action by will. I believe that the American people have that will and that they can put that will strongly behind everything of a material nature that they have so that they, along with their allies, will secure for the future the things they value.

Another attitude of the utmost importance is that we must keep constantly before us the goal toward which we are working. What we are working toward is a situation in which the normal course of settling disputes will be negotiation. We are enthusiastic people, and occasionally we get so enthusiastic about what we are doing that we believe that is the end instead of the means. We must never get ourselves into the state of mind where we say that we are building this strength in order to use it. We are building this strength in order that we may never have to use it, in order that we may get to the point where the normal way to settle things is to sit down, to argue about them, to negotiate about them, and to find a solution with which all parties concerned can live, even though it is not ideal for any of us.

That is not really a hopeless ambition. It seems a long way off—and it is a long way off when you are dealing with the Soviet Union under the present imbalance of power—but we have reached a situation in the Western Hemisphere where negotiation is the normal way of settling disputes. The normal way for the American republics to settle all their differences—and there are very grave and serious difficulties—is by negotiation and reasonable settlement. That has taken nearly 60 years to work out. It has taken all of that time to build up the trust of the American republics among themselves and between them and us. For years we were called the "Colossus of the North," and we took actions from time to time which made the other American republics apprehensive of us, but I think that no longer exists. I do not believe there ever took place in the world a more harmonious or constructive meeting than the recent meeting between the Foreign Ministers of the American republics, in which all sorts of questions, vitally affecting all our countries, were taken up and dis-



cussed. Sometimes points of view were very far apart. On one very tough economic question it took staying up all night for three nights to get people to realize that there was a good deal in common between them! But we solved that question and we will solve other differences in this Hemisphere in that way.

#### **Pattern of Responsibility for Leadership**

There is one last attitude which I should like to stress, and that is that we must always keep in mind that we must deal with these problems within a pattern of responsibility. I should like to talk a little bit about what I mean by a pattern of responsibility. I mean that we must act with the consciousness that our responsibility is to interests which are broader than our own immediate American interests. Great empires have risen in this world and have collapsed because they took too narrow a view. There is no divine command which spares the United States from the seeds of destruction which have operated in other great states. There is no instruction to that one of the Fates who holds the shears that she shall withhold them from the thread of life of the United States. We must operate in a pattern of responsibility which is greater than our own interests. We cannot yield to the temptation, because we are virile and enthusiastic, of thinking that, because we believe a thing, it just must be right. We must not confuse our own opinions with the will of God.

That is essential for leadership. It is not merely a moral dissertation which I am making. It is essential to leadership among the free nations if we are going to maintain the sort of coalition which we have. We cannot take the attitude that we will coerce nations, that we are so right that if they do not do exactly what we want them to do we will withhold economic aid, or we will withhold military aid, we will do this, we will do that. If we take that attitude, then we are creating a relationship indistinguishable from that which exists between the Soviet Union and countries associated with it. That must never be our attitude. We are the leader. We are accepted as the leader. But we will continue to be accepted as the leader only if the other countries believe that the pat-

tern of responsibility within which we operate is a responsibility to interests which are broader than our own—that we know today what Thomas Jefferson was talking about when he spoke of the need of paying a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.

How can we institutionalize that sense of responsibility? The means are at hand, have been used, and must continue to be used. The means lie in the United Nations. There is much talk these days that the United Nations has proved itself ineffective—it does not do this, it does not do that, we must scrap it in favor of some other kind of coercive machinery. I do not agree with any of those views.

I don't think anyone is more conscious than I am, unless it be General Bradley, of the difficulties of working within a coalition as large as the group in the United Nations who are associated together in Korea. There are a thousand problems in working with so many nations, considering their points of view, and modifying your own so that you may maintain a true friend. But I assure you that it is worth it a million times. Whatever loss there is in efficiency of operation is gained a million times by the strength which comes from the group's believing that the leader is paying attention to other people's points of view. We should be forever grateful to the United Nations for furnishing a forum where the United States of America, to maintain its leadership, must enter and must explain itself to the rest of the world, and do so in terms which are so persuasive that countries will be convinced, do so under circumstances where the United States and its representatives listen to the representative of the smallest country in the world who has a point of view which he wishes to express, do so under circumstances where we make every effort to harmonize the views, adjust views, and may not force views down other people's throats. If we do that, then I believe the United States will avoid that narrow view which has led to the destruction of great powers and great empires in the past. The United States will lead into a new course in which the free nations will continue to be free nations, freely associated, freely, willingly, and eagerly accepting leadership which they believe considers their interests as deeply as it does its own.

## Consultations With Iran on Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute

### MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN TO IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER

[Released to the press by the White House July 9]

*The following communication was sent yesterday by the President to the Prime Minister of Iran (the communication was telegraphed by the Secretary of State to Ambassador Grady at Tehran for delivery to the Prime Minister):*

I am most grateful to Your Excellency for giving me in your recent letter a full and frank account of the developments in the unhappy dispute which has arisen between your Government and the British oil interests in Iran. This matter is so full of dangers to the welfare of your own country, of Great Britain, and of all the free world, that I have been giving the most earnest thought to the problems involved. I had hoped that the common interests of the two countries directly involved and the common ground which has been developed in your discussions would open the way to a solution of the troublesome and complicated problems which have arisen. You know of our sympathetic interest in this country in Iran's desire to control its natural resources. From this point of view we were happy to see that the British Government has on its part accepted the principle of nationalization.

Since British skill and operating knowledge can contribute so much to the Iranian oil industry I had hoped—and still hope—that ways could be found to recognize the principle of nationalization and British interests to the benefit of both. For these reasons I have watched with concern the breakdown of your discussions and the drift toward a collapse of oil operations with all the attendant losses to Iran and the world. Surely this is a disaster which statesmanship can find a way to avoid.

Recently I have come to believe that the complexity of the problems involved in a broad settlement and the shortness of the time available before the refinery must shut down—if the present situation continues—require a simple and practicable modus vivendi under which operations can continue and under which the interests of neither side will be prejudiced. Various suggestions to this end have failed. The time available is running out.

In this situation a new and important development has occurred. The International Court of Justice, which your Government, the British Government, and our own, all joined with other nations to establish as the guardian of impartial justice and equity, has made a suggestion for a modus vivendi.

Technical considerations aside, I lay great stress on the action of the Court. I know how sincerely your Government and the British Government believe in the positions which you both have taken in your discussions. However, I am sure you believe even more profoundly in the idea of a world controlled by law and justice which has been the hope of the world since the San Francisco conference. Apart from questions of jurisdiction, no one will doubt the impartiality of the World Court, its eminence, and the respect due to it by all nations who signed the United Nations treaty.

Therefore, I earnestly commend to you a most careful consideration of its suggestion. I suggest that its utterance be thought of not as a decision which is or is not binding depending on technical legal considerations, but as a suggestion of an impartial body, dedicated to justice and equity and to a peaceful world based upon these great conceptions. A study of its suggestion by your Government and by the British Government will, I am sure, develop methods of implementing it which will carry out its wise and impartial purpose—maintaining the operation of the oil industry and preserving the positions of both Governments. Surely no government loses any element of its sovereignty or the support of its people by treating with all possible consideration and respect the utterance of this great Court. Our own Government and people believe this profoundly. Should you take such a position I am sure that the stature of Iran would be greatly enhanced in the eyes of the world.

I have a very sincere desire, Mr. Prime Minister, to be as helpful to you as possible in this circumstance. I have discussed this matter at length with W. Averell Harriman who, as you know, is one of my closest advisers and one of our most eminent citizens. Should you be willing to receive him, I should be happy to have him go to Tehran as my

personal representative to talk over with you this immediate and pressing situation.

May I take this opportunity to assure Your Excellency of my highest consideration and to convey to you my confidence in the future well-being and prosperity of Iran.

#### **REPLY FROM IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

*[Released to the press by the White House July 11]*

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your friendly message of 8th July handed to me by His Excellency the Ambassador of the United States in Teheran just after the Government of Iran had taken its decision with regard to the findings of the International Court of Justice at The Hague. I deem it my duty to thank you once again, Mr. President, for the care you have always taken in the welfare of this country.

As I mentioned in my previous letter, the Government and people of Iran recognize the Government and the people of the United States as the staunch supporters of right and justice and appreciate therefore, with complete sincerity, the interest you are taking in the solution of the economic difficulties of Iran in general and in the oil question in particular.

I am extremely glad to note your reference, Mr. President, to the sympathy and interest of the American Nation in the realization of Iran's national aspirations and the acceptance of the principle of nationalization of the oil industry; for Iran has had and is having no aim other than the acceptance of this principle by virtue of the laws ratified by the two Houses of Parliament, and has always been ready, within the terms of these laws to take any measures for the removal of the present disputes. It is, therefore, a matter of great regret that, insofar as Iran can judge, no proposal or suggestion have been made, up to the present, by the former oil company denoting their acceptance of the principle of nationalization of the oil industry in accordance with the laws ratified by the Parliament—laws which the Government is duty bound to put into force. On the contrary, in their note of 29th June, the representatives of the former oil company made proposals which were against the provisions of these laws and which resulted in the termination of the discussions.

Provided, of course, that our indisputable national rights are respected in accordance with the laws concerning the nationalization of the oil industry, the Government and the people of Iran are ready to enter into immediate discussions with the aim to remove all the disputes so that there may be no stoppage in the production and exploitation of oil—a situation which the Government of Iran has always been anxious to avoid and

which, as you have mentioned, Mr. President, is causing losses to all concerned.

With reference to your desire, Mr. President, to help our country I must state without hesitation that the Iranian Nation and Government fully appreciate this high intent in all sincerity and candor, more so when they find that you have shown your readiness, Mr. President, to send to Teheran as your special representative Averell Harriman, one of the most distinguished American citizens, for consultations.

In the light of our knowledge of Mr. Harriman's personality and his vast experiences, and considering the fact that he will act as your representative, the Iranian Government welcomes this gesture and hopes to take full advantage of consultations with a man of such high standing. In the meanwhile it would also give him the opportunity to become directly acquainted with our views and to obtain first hand knowledge of our living conditions and requirements.

May I avail myself of this opportunity to offer you, Mr. President, the expressions of my best and most sincere regards.

#### **OFFICIAL REMARKS MADE AT AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN'S DEPARTURE**

**THE PRESIDENT:** I want to express to you my appreciation for your willingness to undertake this trip to Iran. It is a very important job that you have undertaken, and one which I think you can handle with satisfaction and success.

All of us want to wish you a pleasant trip, and I hope that you will express to the Iranian Government that our interest is the interest of world peace, and the welfare of Iran and the rest of the world.

We have no selfish interest in the matter whatever.

**SECRETARY ACHESON:** Mr. Harriman, you carry the good wishes of all of us with you, and I know this mission could not be in better hands than yours.

I wish you all the success and luck in the world.

**GENERAL MARSHALL:** I wish you a safe trip and look for success in carrying out your objective.

I have seen you in many parts of the world, and on some very difficult occasions, and I have complete confidence in your ability in this particular issue.

**MR. HARRIMAN:** Mr. President, Mr. Acheson, General Marshall: It seems to me that there is great mutuality of interest between and among the needs of the people of Iran, the British, and the many parts of the world—the people in Europe and the Far East who have been dependent upon the oil that has been coming from Iran.

Under these circumstances, if we can create a spirit of good will, a way can be found to work out the difficulties which are now causing so much trouble.

I go with great appreciation of your confidence, Mr. President, and hope that with that confidence results can be achieved.

**THE PRESIDENT:** Good luck!



**STATEMENT BY GEORGE C. McGHEE,  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN,  
SOUTH ASIAN AND AFRICAN AFFAIRS<sup>1</sup>**

The events which lead to my appearing on this program are very significant for all of us.

Just two days ago President Truman received a message from the Iranian Prime Minister welcoming the President's offer of July 8 to send Mr. Harriman to Iran as the President's personal representative, for consultations on the British-Iranian oil controversy. Mr. Harriman has already started on a 7000 mile airplane flight to Tehran, the capital of Iran. Shortly after his arrival there on Sunday he will meet with the Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosadeq and with other high Iranian officials.

The question of Iranian oil is an extremely complex and controversial matter. The roots of this present crisis go back many years. Although the Soviets stand to benefit greatly from the Iranian oil dispute, the sources of the present difficulty are to be found primarily within Iran—not outside. They stem from the deep desire of the Iranian people to better their way of life, to eliminate poverty, illiteracy, and disease. A danger in Iran is that this understandable spirit of nationalism, and the legitimate desire of the Iranian nation to receive greater benefits from its oil resources, may lead to hasty or emotional acts detrimental to the long-range best interests of Iran.

A stalemate between the parties to the dispute has now lasted for almost 6 weeks. As a result, no oil has left Iran for 3 weeks. The great Iranian oil production and refining industry, which constitutes Iran's largest single source of revenue, is threatened with collapse—the consequences of which could be very serious indeed. The President, the Secretary of State, and the American press and radio have on numerous occasions in recent weeks emphasized the critical and urgent nature of the Iranian situation.

The United States for its part has a deep interest in the continued independence and territorial integrity of Iran. It has sought also to further the welfare and economic betterment of the Iranian people. When the Soviet Union left military forces in Iran in 1946, we gave strong support to the Iranian case in the U.N. Security Council. As a result of Iran's steadfastness and of her support by the United Nations, in which the United States played an important role, Soviet troops were withdrawn. The Soviet objective of obtaining control of Iran has, however, remained unaltered and Soviet pressures have continued unabated.

We can be sure that the Kremlin is losing no opportunity to fish in the troubled oil of Iran, for Iran would be a great and strategic prize quite

apart from oil. Control of Iran, an area approximately as large as the United States east of the Mississippi River, would put the Soviet Union astride the communication routes connecting the free nations of Asia and Europe.

Thus the issues at stake in Iran go far beyond the question of oil, important as oil is for Iran and for the other nations of the free world. There are issues involved which affect the very foundations of law and justice which the free nations of the world have, during the twentieth century, been trying so hard to establish as the basis for settling international disputes.

The United States has consistently urged moderation on the part of the Iranian government and of the British oil interests. We are convinced, as the President said in a press conference 2 weeks ago, that there is plenty of opportunity for a settlement of the oil controversy on a mutually satisfactory basis.

As personal representative of President Truman, Mr. Harriman is flying to Iran to learn as much as he can about the Iranian situation. He will attempt to carry out the President's expressed desire "to be as helpful as possible in this circumstance." He will consult with Iranian officials and report to the President.

We have no magic formula for solving this critical problem which has arisen between our two friends. We do hope that before it is too late—and time is very short—some arrangement, temporary if need be, can be found which will permit the Iranian nation to receive maximum benefit from the exploitation of its oil resources and the West to continue to make its contribution to the Iranian oil industry and to benefit from it.

**U.S. Policy on Trieste  
Remains Unchanged**

*The following is an oral statement issued to the press on July 11 by Michael J. McDermott, Chief Press Officer:*

The American Ambassador at Rome has been authorized to inform Prime Minister de Gasperi that the United States Government has noticed that there has recently been speculation in the Italian press about United States policy regarding Trieste. Accordingly, the United States desires to assure the Prime Minister that United States policy in this respect remains unchanged.

That policy continues to be guided by the spirit of the March 20, 1948, declaration and by the belief that a permanent and peaceful settlement of the Trieste question can best be realized by agreement between the parties directly concerned, Italy, and Yugoslavia.

<sup>1</sup> Made on "Battle Report" over NBC Television Network on July 13 and released to the press on the same date.

## Draft Peace Treaty With Japan and Japanese Declarations

### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR DULLES

[Released to the press July 11]

We now have a draft Japanese peace treaty which we believe will be generally acceptable to the 50-odd nations at war with Japan. No one will be 100 percent satisfied but almost everyone should be about 95 percent satisfied.

There are some unique features. One is procedure. We have used diplomatic discussions instead of a general conference because some of the nations concerned are not on speaking terms with each other and could never be brought together in a conference. This has meant many separate discussions and personal visits. I myself have been to seven of the countries principally concerned in the Pacific, and my deputy, Mr. Allison, has been to two more. Our procedure, while perhaps slower than a general conference, has given every country an even better chance to present its views.

A second unique fact is that the proposed treaty does not put Japan under any permanent restrictions or disabilities which will make her different or less sovereign than any other free nation. The treaty will, in fact, restore Japan as a sovereign equal, and the treaty is truly one of reconciliation. Never in modern times have the victors in a great and bitter war applied this principle. They have, in the name of peace, imposed discriminations and humiliations, which have bred new war. The present treaty would avoid that great error.

Another unique feature is the proposed treatment of the so-called problem of Japanese rearmament. Usually victors impose treaty limitations upon the rearmament of their enemy. These restrictions are rarely enforced, and because they are discriminatory, they often provoke the very result sought to be avoided. We are planning a new and modern approach, inspired by the principles of the United Nations. That principle is to seek security on a collective basis. A byproduct of that is that national forces are so combined with each other that no national force, alone, is an aggressive menace. That is what is contemplated in relation to Japan. Under a collective security treaty there will be a combination of

United States and future Japanese forces, and perhaps others, so that it would be materially impossible for Japan to wage a war of revenge. That is the modern and enlightened way to deal with the problem.

The present draft is sponsored not just by the United States but also by the United Kingdom. That is appropriate. Of the 15 nations principally concerned, 7 are members of the British Commonwealth. The French Government is also in accord. So we have striking evidence of unity as between our 3 great democracies. Also we have reason to hope that the new independent nations of Asia will want to go along with the kind of a peace treaty which we have evolved and which largely takes their views into accord. India and Pakistan, for example, have both taken a lively interest in the evolution of this text.

In addition to international unity, there is a unique measure of domestic unity. As the President's representative and with his full backing I have had complete cooperation from the Department of State and the Department of Defense. We have kept in close touch with the appropriate congressional committees and, despite sharp difference of opinion as to many aspects of Far Eastern policy, Democrats and Republicans have united behind the principles of this treaty.

I believe that the peace conference scheduled for San Francisco in September will, more than any other yet held, reflect the ideals of the United Nations which was born at San Francisco.

### TEXT OF DRAFT TREATY AND DECLARATIONS

[Released to the press July 12]

[A draft peace treaty with Japan and two declarations by Japan have been prepared by the United States Government and the Government of the United Kingdom on the basis of (1) a United States draft treaty, circulated the latter part of March to the Governments of the countries most closely concerned with the war against Japan; (2) an independently prepared United Kingdom draft circulated at about the same time to the British Commonwealth nations, and (3) comments and observations received from the governments concerned in relation to the two preceding drafts.

*The draft was circulated to the countries principally concerned with the war against Japan, except where special circumstances exist, during the week of July 2-6. It was circulated informally to other nations at war with Japan on July 9. The draft will be revised on or about July 20 in the light of any comments received from the nations principally concerned. It will then be formally circulated to all nations at war with Japan, except where special circumstances exist, with a request for any comments they may have and an invitation to a conference for final consideration and signature of the peace treaty which, it is planned, will be held at San Francisco, Calif., on or about September 3, 1951.*

*Texts of the draft treaty and of the two declarations by Japan follow:]*

### **Preamble**

Whereas the Allied Powers and Japan are resolved that henceforth their relations shall be those of nations which, as sovereign equals, cooperate in friendly association to promote their common welfare and to maintain international peace and security, and are therefore desirous of concluding a Treaty of Peace which will settle questions still outstanding as a result of the existence of a state of war between them;

Whereas Japan for its part declares its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations and in all circumstances to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; to strive to realize the objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; to seek to create within Japan conditions of stability and well-being as defined in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations and already initiated by post-surrender Japanese legislation; and in public and private trade and commerce to conform to internationally accepted fair practices;

Whereas the Allied Powers welcome the intentions of Japan set out in the foregoing paragraph;

The Allied Powers and Japan have therefore determined to conclude the present Treaty of Peace, and have accordingly appointed the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, who, after presentation of their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions.

### **Chapter I: PEACE**

#### **Article 1.**

The state of war between Japan and each of the Allied Powers is hereby terminated as from the date on which the present Treaty comes into force between Japan and the Allied Powers concerned, as provided for in Article 23.

### **Chapter II: TERRITORY**

#### **Article 2.**

(a) Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.

(b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.

(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.

(d) Japan renounces all right, title and claim in connection with the League of Nations Mandate System, and accepts the action of the United Nations Security Council of April 2, 1947, extending the trusteeship system to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate to Japan.

(e) Japan renounces all claim to any right or title to or interest in connection with any part of the Antarctic area, whether deriving from the activities of Japanese nationals or otherwise.

(f) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Spratly Island and the Paracel Islands.

#### **Article 3.**

Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

#### **Article 4.**

(a) The disposition of property of Japan and of its nationals in the areas referred to in Articles 2 and 3, and their claims, including debts against the authorities presently administering the areas referred to above and the residents (including juridical persons) thereof, and the disposition in Japan of property of such authorities and residents, and of claims, including debts, of such authorities and residents against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between Japan and such authorities. The property of any of the Allied Powers or its nationals in the areas referred to in Articles 2 and 3 shall, insofar as this has not already been done, be returned by the administering authority in the condition in which it now exists. (The term nationals whenever used in the present Treaty includes juridical persons.)

(b) Japanese owned submarine cables connecting Japan with territory removed from Japanese control pursuant to the present Treaty shall be equally divided, Japan retaining the Japanese terminal and adjoining half of the cable, and the detached territory the remainder of the cable and connecting terminal facilities.

### **Chapter III: SECURITY**

#### **Article 5.**

(a) Japan accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular the obligations

(i) to settle its international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

(ii) to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations;

(iii) to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations may take preventive or enforcement action.

(b) The Allied Powers confirm that they will be guided by the principles of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations in their relations with Japan.

(c) The Allied Powers for their part recognize that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements.

#### **Article 6.**

(a) All occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present Treaty, and in any case not later than 90 days thereafter. Nothing in this provision shall however prevent the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory under or in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements which have been or may be made between one or more of



the Allied Powers, on the one hand, and Japan on the other.

(b) All Japanese property for which compensation has not already been paid, which was supplied for the use of the occupation forces and which remains in the possession of those forces at the time of the coming into force of the present Treaty, shall be returned to the Japanese Government within the same 90 days unless other arrangements are made by mutual agreement.

#### Chapter IV: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CLAUSES

##### Article 7.

(a) Each of the Allied Powers, within one year after the present Treaty has come into force between it and Japan, will notify Japan which of its prewar bilateral treaties with Japan it wishes to continue in force or revive, and any treaties so notified shall continue in force or be revived subject only to such amendments as may be necessary to ensure conformity with the present Treaty. The treaties so notified shall be considered as having been continued in force or revived three months after the date of notification and shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. All such treaties as to which Japan is not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated.

(b) Any notification made under paragraph (a) of this Article may except from the operation or revival of a treaty any territory for the international relations of which the notifying Power is responsible, until three months after the date on which notice is given to Japan that such exception shall cease to apply.

##### Article 8.

(a) Japan will recognize the full force of all treaties now or hereafter concluded by the Allied Powers for terminating the state of war initiated on September 1st, 1939, as well as any other arrangements by the Allied Powers for or in connection with the restoration of peace. Japan also accepts the arrangements made for terminating the former League of Nations and Permanent Court of International Justice.

(b) Japan renounces all such rights and interests as she may derive from being a signatory power of the Conventions of St. Germain-en-Laye of September 10, 1919, and the Straits Agreement of Montreux of July 20, 1936, and from Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Lausanne July 24, 1923.

(c) Japan renounces all rights, title and interests acquired under, and is discharged from all obligations resulting from, the Agreement between Germany and the Creditor Powers of January 20, 1930, and its Annexes, including the Trust Agreement, dated May 17, 1930, the Convention of January 20, 1930, respecting the Bank for International Settlements, and the Statutes of the Bank for International Settlements. Japan will notify to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris within six months of the coming into force of the present Treaty its renunciation of the rights, title and interests referred to in this paragraph.

##### Article 9.

Japan will enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers so desiring for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas.

##### Article 10.

Japan renounces all special rights and interests in China, including all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on September 7, 1901, and all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto, and agrees to the abrogation in respect to Japan of the said protocol, annexes, notes and documents.

##### Article 11.

Japan accepts the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes Courts both within and outside Japan, and will carry out the sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned in Japan. The power to grant clemency, reduce sentences and parole with respect to such prisoners may not be exercised except on the decision of the Government or Governments which imposed the sentence in each instance, and on the recommendation of Japan. In the case of persons sentenced by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, such power may not be exercised except on the decision of a majority of the Governments represented on the Tribunal, and on the recommendation of Japan.

##### Article 12.

(a) Japan declares its readiness promptly to enter into negotiations for the conclusion with each of the Allied Powers of treaties or agreements to place their trading, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis.

(b) Pending the conclusion of the relevant treaty or agreement, Japan will, during a period of four years from the coming into force of the present Treaty:—

(1) accord to each of the Allied Powers, its nationals, products and vessels

(i) most-favored-nation treatment with respect to customs duties, charges, restrictions and other regulations, on or in connection with the importation and exportation of goods;

(ii) national treatment with respect to shipping, navigation and imported goods, and with respect to natural and juridical persons and their interests—such treatment to include all matters pertaining to the levying and collection of taxes, access to the courts, the making and performance of contracts, rights to property, participation in juridical entities constituted under Japanese law, and generally the conduct of all kinds of business and professional activities.

(2) ensure that external purchases and sales of Japanese state trading enterprises shall be based solely on commercial considerations.

(c) In respect to any matter, however, Japan shall be obliged to accord to an Allied Power national treatment, or most-favored-nation treatment, only to the extent that the Allied Power concerned accords Japan national treatment or most-favored-nation treatment, as the case may be, in respect of the same matter. The reciprocity envisaged in the foregoing sentence shall be determined, in the case of products, vessels and juridical entities of, and persons domiciled in, any non-metropolitan territory of an Allied Power, and in the case of juridical entities of, and persons domiciled in, any state or province of an Allied Power having a federal government, by reference to the treatment accorded to Japan in such territory, state or province.

(d) In the application of this Article, a discriminatory measure shall not be considered to derogate from the grant of national or most-favored-nation treatment, as the case may be, if such measure is based on an exception customarily provided for in the commercial treaties of the party applying it, or on the need to safeguard that party's external financial position or balance of payments (except in respect to shipping and navigation), or on the need to maintain its essential security interests, and provided such measure is proportionate to the circumstances and not applied in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.

(e) Japan's obligations under paragraph (b) of this Article shall not be affected by the exercise of any Allied rights under Article 14 of the present Treaty; nor shall the provisions of that paragraph be understood as limiting the undertakings assumed by Japan by virtue of Article 15 of the Treaty.

#### Article 13.

(a) Japan will enter into negotiations with any of the Allied Powers, promptly upon the request of such Power or Powers, for the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements relating to international civil air transport.

(b) Pending the conclusion of such agreement or agreements, Japan will, during a period of four years, extend to such Power treatment not less favorable with respect to air-traffic rights and privileges than those exercised by any such Powers at the time of coming into force of the present Treaty, and will accord complete equality of opportunity in respect to the operation and development of air services.

(c) Pending its becoming a party to the Convention on International Civil Aviation in accordance with Article 93 thereof, Japan will give effect to the provisions of that Convention applicable to the international navigation of aircraft, and give effect to the standards, practices and procedures adopted as annexes to the Convention in accordance with the terms of the Convention.

### Chapter V: CLAIMS AND PROPERTY

#### Article 14.

(a) It is recognized that, although Japan should in principle pay reparation for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war, nevertheless Japan lacks the capacity, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make adequate reparation to the Allied Powers and at the same time meet its other obligations.

However,

1. Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by Japan, with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done, by making available the skills and industry of the Japanese people in manufacturing, salvaging and other services to be rendered to the Allied Powers in question. Such arrangements shall avoid the imposition of additional liabilities on other Allied Powers, and, where the manufacturing of raw materials is called for, they shall be supplied by the Allied Powers in question, so as not to throw any foreign exchange burden upon Japan.

2. (I) Each of the Allied Powers shall have the right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of all property, rights and interests of

(a) Japan and of Japanese nationals

(b) persons acting for or on behalf of Japan or Japanese nationals, and

(c) entities owned or controlled by Japan or Japanese nationals

which on the coming into force of the present Treaty were subject to its jurisdiction, except:

(i) property of Japanese nationals who during the war resided with the permission of the Government concerned in the territory of one of the Allied Powers, other than territory occupied by Japan, except property subjected during that period to measures not generally applied by the Government of the territory where the property was situated to the property of other Japanese nationals resident in such territory;

(ii) all real property, furniture and fixtures owned by the Government of Japan and used for diplomatic or consular purposes, and all personal furniture and furnishings and other private property not of an investment nature which was normally necessary for the carrying out of diplomatic and consular functions, owned by Japanese diplomatic and consular personnel;

(iii) property belonging to religious bodies or private charitable institutions and used exclusively for religious or charitable purposes;

(iv) property rights arising after the resumption of trade and financial relations between the country concerned and Japan before the coming into force of the present Treaty, except in the case of any rights resulting from transactions contrary to the laws of the Allied Power concerned;

(v) obligations of Japan or Japanese nationals, any right, title or interest in tangible property located in Japan, interests in enterprises organized under the laws of Japan, or any paper evidence thereof; provided that this exception shall only apply to obligations of Japan and its nationals expressed in Japanese currency.

(II) Property referred to in exceptions (i) to (v) above shall be returned subject to reasonable expenses for its preservation and administration. If any such property has been liquidated the proceeds shall be returned instead.

(III) The right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of Japanese property referred to above shall be exercised in accordance with the laws of the Allied Power concerned, and the Japanese owner shall have only such rights as may be given him by those laws.

(IV) The Allied Powers agree to deal with Japanese trade-marks and literary and artistic property rights on a basis as favorable to Japan as circumstances ruling in each country will permit.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.

#### Article 15.

(a) Upon application made within nine months of the coming into force of the present Treaty Japan will, within six months of the date of such application, return the property, tangible and intangible, and all rights or interests of any kind in Japan of each Allied Power and its nationals which was within Japan at any time between December 7, 1941, and September 2, 1945, unless the owner has freely disposed thereof without duress or fraud. Such property shall be returned free of all encumbrances and charges to which it may have become subject because of the war, and without any charges for its return. Property whose return is not applied for by the owner within the prescribed period may be disposed of by the Japanese Government as it may determine. In cases where such property was within Japan on December 7, 1941, and cannot be returned or has suffered injury or damage, compensation will be made in accordance with Law No. ---- enacted by the Japanese Diet on ---- 1951.

(b) With respect to industrial property rights impaired during the war, Japan will continue to accord to the Allied Powers and their nationals benefits no less than those heretofore accorded by Cabinet Orders No. 309 effective September 1, 1949, No. 12 effective January 28, 1950, and No. 9 effective February 1, 1950, all as now amended, provided such nationals have applied for such benefits within time limits prescribed therein.

(c) (i) Japan acknowledges that the literary and artistic property rights which existed in Japan on the 6th December, 1941, in respect to the published and unpublished works of the Allied Powers and their nationals have continued in force since that date, and recognizes those rights which have arisen, or but for the war would have arisen, in Japan since that date, by the operation of any conventions and agreements to which Japan was a party on that date, irrespective of whether or not such conventions or agreements were abrogated or suspended upon or since the outbreak of war by the domestic law of Japan or of the Allied Power concerned.

(ii) Without the need for application by the proprietor of the right and without the payment of any fee or compliance with any other formality, the period from the

7th December, 1941, until the coming into force of the present Treaty, shall be excluded from the running of the normal term of such rights; and such period, with an additional period of 6 months, shall be excluded from the time within which a literary work must be translated into Japanese in order to obtain translating rights in Japan.

(Note: Paragraph (a) of this Article is dependent upon the acceptability of the legislation to be passed by Japan.

#### Article 16.

As an expression of its desire to indemnify those members of the armed forces of the Allied Powers who suffered undue hardships while prisoners of war of Japan, Japan will transfer its assets and those of its nationals in countries which were neutral during the war, or which were at war with any of the Allied Powers, or at its option the equivalent of such assets, to the International Committee of the Red Cross which shall liquidate such assets and distribute the resultant fund for the benefit of former prisoners of war and their families on such basis as it may determine to be equitable. The categories of assets described in Article 14 (a) 2 (I) (ii) through (v) of the present Treaty shall be excepted from transfer. It is equally understood that the transfer provision of this Article has no application to the 19,770 shares in the Bank for International Settlements presently owned by Japanese Financial Institutions.

[Note: The status of Japanese assets in Thailand is subject to further consideration.]

#### Article 17.

(a) Upon the request of any of the Allied Powers, the Japanese Government shall review and revise in conformity with international law any decision or order of the Japanese Prize Courts in cases involving ownership rights of nationals of that Allied Power and shall supply copies of all documents comprising the records of these cases, including the decisions taken and orders issued. In any case in which such review or revision shows that restoration is due, the provisions of Article 15 shall apply to the property concerned.

(b) The Japanese Government shall take the necessary measures to enable nationals of any of the Allied Powers at any time within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty to submit to the appropriate Japanese authorities for review any judgment given by a Japanese court between 7th December, 1941, and the coming into force of the present Treaty in any proceedings in which any such national was unable to make adequate presentation of his case either as plaintiff or defendant. The Japanese Government shall provide that, where the national has suffered injury by reason of any such judgment, he shall be restored in the position in which he was before the judgment was given or shall be afforded such relief as may be just and equitable in the circumstances.

#### Article 18.

(a) It is recognized that the intervention of the state of war has not affected the obligation to pay pecuniary debts arising out of obligations and contracts (including those in respect of bonds) which existed and rights which were acquired before the existence of a state of war, and which are due by the Government or nationals of Japan to the Government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers, or are due by the Government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers to the Government or nationals of Japan. The intervention of a state of war shall equally not be regarded as affecting the obligation to consider on their merits claims for loss or damage to property or for personal injury or death which arose before the existence of a state of war, and which may be presented

or re-presented by the Government of one of the Allied Powers to the Government of Japan, or by the Government of Japan to any of the Governments of the Allied Powers. The provisions of this paragraph are without prejudice to the rights conferred by Article 14.

(b) Japan affirms its liabilities for the prewar external debt of the Japanese State and for debts of corporate bodies subsequently declared to be liabilities of the Japanese State, and expresses its intention to enter into negotiations at an early date with its creditors with respect to the resumption of payments on those debts; to facilitate negotiations in respect to private prewar claims and obligations; and to facilitate the transfer of sums accordingly.

#### Article 19.

(a) Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nationals against the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of the war or out of actions taken because of the existence of a state of war, and waives all claims arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of any of the Allied Powers in Japanese territory prior to the coming into force of the present Treaty.

(b) The foregoing waiver includes any claims arising out of actions taken by any of the Allied Powers with respect to Japanese ships between 1st September, 1939, and the coming into force of the present Treaty, as well as any claims and debts arising in respect to Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of the Allied Powers.

(c) Subject to reciprocal renunciation, the Japanese Government also renounces all claims (including debts) against Germany and German nationals on behalf of the Japanese Government and Japanese nationals, including intergovernmental claims and claims for loss or damage sustained during the war, but excepting (a) claims in respect of contracts entered into and rights acquired before the 1st September, 1939, and (b) claims arising out of trade and financial relations between Japan and Germany after the 2nd September, 1945.

#### Article 20.

Japan will take all necessary measures to ensure such disposition of German assets in Japan as has been or may be determined by those powers entitled under the Protocol of the proceedings of the Berlin Conference of 1945 to dispose of those assets, and pending the final disposition of such assets will be responsible for the conservation and administration thereof.

#### Article 21.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 25 of the present Treaty, China shall be entitled to the benefits of Articles 10 and 14 (a) 2; and Korea to the benefits of Articles 2, 9 and 12 of the present Treaty.

### Chapter VI: SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

#### Article 22.

If in the opinion of any Party to the present Treaty there has arisen a dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of the Treaty, which is not settled by other agreed means, the dispute shall, at the request of any party thereto, be referred for decision to the International Court of Justice. Japan and those Allied Powers which are not already parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice will deposit with the Registrar of the Court, at the time of their respective ratifications of the present Treaty, and in conformity with the resolution of the United Nations Security Council, dated 15th October, 1946, a general declaration accepting the jurisdiction, without special agreement, of the Court generally in respect to all disputes of the character referred to in this Article.



## Chapter VII: FINAL CLAUSES

### Article 23.

(a) The present Treaty shall be ratified by the States which sign it, including Japan, and will come into force for all the States which have then ratified it, when instruments of ratification have been deposited by Japan and by a majority, including the United States of America as the principal occupying Power, of the following States, (here would appear the names of such of the following States as are signatories to the present Treaty) namely, Australia, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, France, India, Indonesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America. The present treaty shall come into force for each State which subsequently ratifies it, on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

(b) If the Treaty has not come into force within nine months after the date of the deposit of Japan's ratification, any State which has ratified it may bring the Treaty into force between itself and Japan by a notification to that effect given to the Government of Japan and of the United States of America not later than three years after the date of deposit of Japan's ratification.

### Article 24.

All instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America which will notify all the signatory States of each deposit and of any notifications made under paragraph (b) of Article 23 of the present Treaty.

### Article 25.

For the purposes of the present Treaty the Allied Powers shall be the States at war with Japan which have signed and ratified it. Subject to the provisions of Article 21, the present Treaty shall not confer any rights, titles or benefits on any State which is not an Allied Power as herein defined; nor shall any right, title or interest of Japan be deemed to be diminished or prejudiced by any provision of the Treaty in favor of a State which is not an Allied Power as so defined.

### Article 26.

Japan will be prepared to conclude with any State which signed or adhered to the United Nations Declaration of 1st January, 1942, and which is at war with Japan, which is not a signatory of the present Treaty, a bilateral Treaty of Peace on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present Treaty, but this obligation on the part of Japan will expire three years after the coming into force of the present Treaty. Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.

### Article 27.

The present Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America which shall furnish each signatory State with a certified copy thereof and notify each such State of the date of the coming into force of the Treaty under paragraph (a) of Article 23 of the present Treaty.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at \_\_\_\_\_ this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_ 1951, in the English, French, Russian and Spanish languages, all being equally authentic, and in the Japanese language.

July 23, 1951

958202-51-3

## Declaration

With respect to the Treaty of Peace signed this day, the Government of Japan makes the following Declaration:

1. Except as otherwise provided in the said Treaty of Peace, Japan recognizes the full force of all presently effective multilateral international instruments to which Japan was a party on 1st September, 1939, and declares that it will, on the coming into force of the said Treaty, resume all its rights and obligations under those instruments. Where, however, participation in any instrument involves membership in an international organization of which Japan ceased to be a member on or after 1st September, 1939, the provisions of the present paragraph shall be dependent on Japan's readmission to membership in the organization concerned.

2. It is the intention of the Japanese Government formally to accede to the following international instruments within six months of the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace:

- (1) Protocol opened for signature at Lake Success on 11th December 1946 amending the agreements, conventions, and protocols on narcotic drugs of 23rd January, 1912, 11th February, 1925, 19th February, 1925, 13th July, 1931, 27th November, 1931, and 26th June, 1936;
- (2) Protocol opened for signature at Paris on 19th November, 1948 bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the convention of 13th July, 1931 for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended by the protocol signed at Lake Success on 11th December, 1946;
- (3) International Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards signed at Geneva on 26th September, 1927.
- (4) International Convention relating to Economic Statistics with Protocol signed at Geneva on 14th December, 1928 and Protocol amending the International Convention of 1928 relating to Economic Statistics signed at Paris on 9th December, 1948.
- (5) International Convention relating to the simplification of Customs Formalities, with Protocol of signature, signed at Geneva on 3rd November, 1923.
- (6) Agreement for the prevention of false indications of origin of goods signed at London on 2nd June, 1934;
- (7) Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air, and additional protocol, signed at Warsaw on 12th October, 1929;
- (8) Convention on safety of life at sea opened for signature at London 19th June, 1948;
- (9) Geneva conventions of 12th August, 1949 for the protection of war victims.

3. It is equally the intention of the Japanese Government, within six months of the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace, to apply for Japan's admission to participation in (a) the Convention on International Civil Aviation opened for signature at Chicago on the 7th December, 1944, and as soon as Japan is itself a party to that Convention, to accept the International Air Services Transit Agreement also opened for signature at Chicago on 7th December, 1944; and (b) the Convention of the World Meteorological Organization signed at Washington under date of October 11th, 1947.

## Declaration

With respect to the Treaty of Peace signed this day, the Government of Japan makes the following Declaration:

Japan will recognize any Commission, Delegation or other Organization authorized by any of the Allied Powers

to identify, list, maintain or regulate its war graves, cemeteries and memorials in Japanese territory; will facilitate the work of such Organizations, and will, in respect of the above-mentioned war graves, cemeteries and memorials, enter into negotiations for the conclusion of such agreements as may prove necessary with the Allied Power concerned, or with any Commission, Delegation or other Organization authorized by it.

## EXCHANGE OF MEMORANDA WITH U.S.S.R.

### Soviet Memorandum of June 10

*Following is an unofficial English translation of the Soviet memorandum concerning a Japanese Peace Treaty which was handed the American Ambassador at Moscow on June 10:*

The Government of the U.S.S.R. received from the Government of the United States of America on May 19, 1951, a memorandum representing an answer to the "remarks of the Government of the U.S.S.R. on the United States of America draft peace treaty with Japan" of May 7, 1951.

The Soviet Government takes notice of the statement of the Government of the United States that it, having examined the remarks of the Government of the Soviet Union on the memorandum of the Government of the United States of America of March 29, 1951, considers that the divergencies which exist between the views of the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the peace terms set forth in the American March draft are not so great as to prevent achievement of agreement on a peace treaty.

Inasmuch, however, as along with the statement mentioned, considerations respecting the "remarks of the Government of the U.S.S.R. on the United States of America draft peace treaty with Japan" of May as set forth in the American memorandum of May 19 which give an interpretation that is incorrect and that in several instances distorts the meaning of these remarks, the Soviet Government for the purpose of introducing full clarity considers it necessary to state the following:

#### 1. Concerning basic positions in American draft peace treaty with Japan.

(a) For the Soviet Union as well as for other countries interested in a guarantee of lasting peace in the Far East question that Japan not become an aggressive state again and that *revival of Japanese militarism be prevented* possesses most important significance.

As is known, little more than 10 years ago a militaristic Japan attacked the Soviet Union in the region of Vladivostok. In the course of 15 years Japanese imperialism, invading China, harassed the Chinese people causing them great hardships. Japanese imperialists did not stop at attacking the United States and later a whole series of states in Asia including India, which unleashed war in the entire Far East.

Is there in the American draft peace treaty with

Japan a guarantee against the rebirth of Japan as an aggressive state? Acquaintance with this draft shows that it does not possess any guarantee in this respect.

In connection with this it was stated in the "remarks of the Soviet Government on the U.S.A. draft peace treaty with Japan" that the "American draft not only does not contain guarantees against the restoration of Japanese militarism, but in general does not set forth any limitations with respect to the size of the armed forces of Japan," as was done, for example, in the peace treaty with Italy, although there is no basis for such a privileged position for Japan in comparison with Italy.

Having no possibility of refuting this assertion of the Soviet Government, the Government of the United States of America in its statements on this question in its memorandum of May 19 falls into patent contradiction. On the one hand, in this memorandum it states that allegedly no agreements "exist in reality" between the powers on the question of demilitarization of Japan "except decisions concerning the period of occupation." However, on the other hand, the Government of the United States of America refers here to the Potsdam declaration of the Four Powers concerning the situation of Japan, whereas the basic purpose of the occupation of Japan is set forth there as the task of obtaining "convincing proof that the capacity of Japan to wage war has been destroyed," which refers, as is obvious, not only to the period of occupation but also to the subsequent period.

Furthermore, there exists directives of the Far Eastern Commission, which as early as June 19, 1947, took an important decision, contained in its document *Basic Policy with Respect to Japan After its Capitulation*. In this basic document of the Far Eastern Commission adopted with the participation of representatives of Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Holland, New Zealand, the Philippines, U.S.S.R., England, and the United States of America, the task was placed in the forefront:

Of accomplishing the physical and spiritual demilitarization of Japan by means of the execution of a series of measures requiring the establishment of a period of strict control, including complete disarmament, the carrying out of economic reform the purpose of which would be to deprive Japan of the possibility of waging war, the eradication of militaristic influences and carrying out of strict justice with respect to war criminals.

Naturally, this decision also concerns not only the period of occupation.

After the facts cited, it becomes clear how far from reality is the assertion of the Government of the United States of America that allegedly no agreements "exists in reality" between the powers with respect to the demilitarization of Japan "except decisions concerning the period of occupation."

After the facts cited, it cannot be denied that, inasmuch as no limitations on the armed forces of Japan are contained in the American draft, there are no guarantees there against the restoration of Japanese militarism and the possibility of repetition of Japanese aggression. It is clear that no state that experienced the aggressive attack of Japan and is interested in the guarantee of lasting peace in the Far East can agree with such a position.

Together with this, the Government of the United States of America, with the help of its occupation authorities, is in reality already carrying out a policy of restoring Japanese militarism. This is evident from the fact that the American occupation authorities are not only not taking measures for the liquidation of military bases in Japan but, on the contrary, are trying to expand them considerably, modernize, and utilize them for aggressive purposes. In Japan they have already begun the recreation of a land army and of naval and air fleets; are restoring and expanding the work of former Japanese military arsenals and military enterprises; are freeing Japanese war criminals; are restoring military organizations, and more and more promoting propaganda of war; and are elevating the role and influence of the supporters of the rebirth of militarism in the governmental apparatus. Moreover, the United States, as the Government of the United States of America basically admits itself in its memorandum of May 19, has already begun the utilization of the industrial and human resources of Japan for its military intervention in Korea which is being carried out illegally under the flag of the United Nations organization.

The draft peace treaty of the United States of America, as well as the policy carried out by the American occupation authorities in Japan, testify to the fact that the Government of the United States of America is not observing obligations it took upon itself in international agreements not to allow the rebirth of Japanese militarism. In essence, the American draft peace treaty with Japan, and likewise the memorandum of the United States of America of May 19 pursue not the peaceful purposes of prevention of a repetition of Japanese aggression but the aggressive purposes of reestablishment of Japanese militarism.

No guarantees are contained in the American draft peace treaty with Japan for assuring the future security of countries which suffered from the aggression of militaristic Japan, although it is clear to anyone that this should be one of the main tasks of the peace treaty. Instead of this it is especially stipulated in the draft that Japan should be accorded the opportunity to make "a contribution toward assurance of its own security," which allegedly corresponds to the "right to individual and collective self defense" provided for member countries of the United Nations in the United Nations Charter.

This question is even more frankly discussed in the memorandum of the United States of America of May 19. In this memorandum it is stated that the Government of the United States of America intends "to enter into an agreement concerning security with Japan for the period after the conclusion of the treaty," i. e. the conclusion of a military agreement between the United States of America and Japan is envisaged.

From this it follows that the task of not permitting the rebirth of Japanese militarism and guaranteeing in the future the security of countries that suffered from Japanese aggression is being replaced by the Government of the United States of America by the conclusion of a military agreement with Japan which would push Japan even more toward the restoration of militarism. Inasmuch as it is perfectly obvious that such countries as the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union are excluded from participation in this military agreement of the United States of America with Japan, there can be no doubt that this military agreement of the United States of America with Japan is directed primarily against these very states and possesses an obvious aggressive character.

After this it becomes clear that all references to the Charter of the United Nations, to the "right to individual and collective self-defense" in this case obviously have no substance and are false throughout.

It is likewise not necessary to prove that the references of the American memorandum also to the statement of J. V. Stalin, made on March 10, 1939, on the matter of struggle with aggression and the collective security of peaceloving countries are not only completely inappropriate here but are also hypocritical.

Thus, the memorandum of the United States of America of May 19 shows that the American draft peace treaty with Japan not only did not provide guarantees against the rebirth of Japanese militarism which has caused such hardships for peaceloving peoples but, on the contrary, pushes Japan on the path of aggression that has already led the Japanese Government to the verge of ruin, and consequently fundamentally runs counter to the interests of guaranteeing lasting peace in the Far East, as well as to the national interests of Japan itself.

*(b) Concerning Termination of the Occupation of Japan and Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from Japanese Territory.*

In its comments of May 7, the Soviet Government proposed that precise mention be made in the treaty that "after conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan all occupation troops should be withdrawn from Japanese territory within not more than one year and that no foreign states should have troops or military bases in Japan."

As is known, in the peace treaty with Italy, as well as with other peace treaties with European



countries, it is specifically mentioned that the occupation should be terminated in the shortest possible time and in any event not more than 90 days from the date of the entry of the peace treaty into force. However, in the American draft peace treaty with Japan no time limit is mentioned for the withdrawal of occupation forces from Japan. The vague statement contained in the memorandum of the United States of America of May 19 that the "occupation will cease with the entry of the treaty into force" without mention of any time limit for withdrawal of the occupation troops can only lead to confusion; all the more since it is evident from this memorandum that the United States of America in reality does not intend to withdraw its troops even after the conclusion of the peace treaty but intends to leave its armed forces in Japan, allegedly "not as occupation troops."

In refusing to set a time limit for the withdrawal of the occupation troops from Japanese territory, the Government of the United States of America breaks one of its important obligations under international agreements. Leaving foreign troops in Japan after conclusion of a peace treaty, under whatever pretext it is done, contradicts the Potsdam declaration of July 26, 1945, which provides for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Japan and signifies camouflaged prolongation of the occupation of Japan for an indefinite protracted period.

In intending to prolong the occupation even after the conclusion of the peace treaty, the Government of the United States of America is thus aspiring to remain the real master in Japan for a long time. In such a situation, the Government of the United States of America can count on the preservation of those privileges which it has guaranteed for itself during the years of occupation, it can count on prolongation of the political and economic dependence of Japan on the United States of America and can count not only on the retention but even on the further expansion of its military bases on Japan. It is clear that all this can only harm the course of peaceful settlement with Japan and the strengthening of peace in the Far East.

Therefore it is necessary that in the peace treaty with Japan the time limit for withdrawal of occupation troops from Japanese territory be precisely fixed and that in this treaty it should be established that no foreign state should have troops or military bases in Japan.

*(c) Concerning the Inadmissibility of Participation by Japan in a Coalition Against States Having an Interest in Signing a Peace Treaty with Her.*

In connection with what has been set forth, it becomes clear why the Government of the United States of America does not agree in its memorandum with the proposal of the Soviet Union to oblige Japan not to enter into a coalition directed

against any state having an interest in signing a peace treaty with Japan. The reference of the Government of the United States of America to the fact that Japan should, in conformity with article 2 of the United Nations Charter refrain from aggression or from application of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any state is obviously without substance. Experience has shown that the Government of the United States utilizes the political and economic dependence of other United Nations member states (first of all—participants in the North Atlantic Union and the Latin American Republics) in order to transform the United Nation into a weapon for unleashing aggressive war in the Far East. The reference to article 2 of the United Nations Charter in the memorandum of the Government of the United States of America, and also in article 6 in the American draft peace treaty was calculated on utilization of Japan as well for this purpose.

Besides, it is not difficult to understand that the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the nonparticipation of Japan in a coalition acquires important and immediate significance on the strength of possible military agreement of the United States of America with Japan.

*(d) Concerning the Removal of Limitations From the Peaceful Economy of Japan and From the Trade of Japan with Other Countries.*

The memorandum of the United States of America of May 19 bypasses the question of the peacetime economy of Japan being placed in servile dependence on the United States of America as the result of all kinds of limitations with respect to the Japanese peacetime economy and the establishment of privileges for American firms sponsored by American occupation authorities. Japan is deprived of the opportunity of engaging in normal trade with neighboring states, which still further harms prospects for the upsurge of Japanese national economy.

The Soviet Government considers that without the effective removal of these restrictions imposed from outside, it would be impossible to create conditions for the upsurge of a peaceful economy and for improving the life of the Japanese people.

*(e) Concerning the Guarantee of Democratic Rights to the Japanese People.*

Judging from the memorandum of the United States of America of March 19 everything essential has already been achieved with respect to the democratization of Japan. But this is wholly untrue. In fact, in Japan, police suppression of organs of the democratic press, repressions against trade unions and other democratic organizations and persecutions for political convictions are being fully revived, with the cooperation of the occupation authorities, and a return to the pre-war fascist order in Japan when the shameful law on the struggle against "dangerous thoughts" existed, is taking place.

All this confirms the necessity for adopting those proposals concerning the democratization of Japan which were put forward in the comments of the Soviet Government.

(f) *Concerning Fulfillment of the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration and the Yalta Agreement With Regard to the Territorial Questions.*

As far as the territorial questions are concerned, the Soviet Government proposes only one thing—guarantee of the honorable fulfilment of the international agreements mentioned above, under which stands the signature of the United States of America itself.

As is known, it is stated in the Cairo declaration that the island of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands should be returned to the Chinese Republic. Inasmuch as the Chinese Republic has been transformed into the Chinese People's Republic and only the Chinese People's Republic expresses the will of the Chinese people, it is clearly obvious that Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands should be transferred to the Chinese People's Republic. In the contrary event the Cairo Agreement will not be fulfilled and the entire responsibility for this would fall on the Government of the United States of America.

As far as the Ryukyu, Bonin, Roshio, Volcano, Pares Vela, and Marcus Islands are concerned, the memorandum of the United States of America of May 19 contains nothing which would require fresh confirmation on the part of the Soviet Government of what was set forth in the comments of the Soviet Government of May 7.

(g) *Concerning Slandorous Attacks Against the U.S.S.R.*

In the memorandum of the Government of the United States of America of May 19 it is stated: "In view of the known fact of the acquisition by the U.S.S.R. of zones of interest in Manchuria, the Government of the United States of America hastens to inquire the significance of the desire of the Soviet government to avoid references to the return of Manchuria". The Soviet Government considers it necessary to state in this respect that the U.S.S.R. does not possess any zones of interest in Manchuria, and as is known to all considers Manchuria as an inseparable part of the Chinese People's Republic. In view of this the above-mentioned statement of the American memorandum must be held as deplorable fabrications of idle people and malicious slander of the U. S. S. R.

It cannot be unknown to the Government of the United States of America that the Soviet Union after defeating the Japanese Kwantung army liberated Manchuria and returned it to the lawful authority of the Chinese people. As far as the rights to the naval base of Port Arthur and to the Chinese-Changchun railway, which were granted to the Soviet Union according to the Yalta

agreement and the Sino-Soviet agreement of August 14, 1945, are concerned, the Soviet Government voluntarily and without compensation renounced these rights in favor of the Chinese People's Republic. Appropriate agreements concluded in Moscow on February 14, 1950, were published at the time and of course are known to the Government of the United States of America.

According to this agreement the Soviet Union, as is known, is to liquidate not later than 1952 its naval base at Port Arthur and withdraw its troops thence.

According to the opinion of the Soviet Government it would be much better if the Government of the United States of America would refrain from slander of the U.S.S.R. on the subject of Manchuria and concern itself with the withdrawal of its armed forces from Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands and return these illegally seized territories to their lawful owner—the Chinese People's Republic.

In the memorandum of the Government of the United States of America of May 19 it was also stated that the Soviet Government allegedly "in violation of the surrender terms is delaying the return of approximately 200,000 Japanese soldiers to their homes and peacetime life."

There can be no doubt that the Government of the United States of America itself does not attach any credence to this statement. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to recall that as early as April 22, 1950, the official report of the termination of repatriation of Japanese war prisoners from the Soviet Union was published, which, as were subsequent communications on this matter, were brought to the notice of the powers. In the report mentioned above it was pointed out that only 1,487 Japanese war prisoners, convicted and undergoing investigation for military crimes committed by them, 9 Japanese war prisoners subject to repatriation after the completion of medical treatment, and 971 Japanese war prisoners who had committed serious crimes against the Chinese people and would be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Chinese People's Republic, remained unrepatriated.

Consequently, the assertion in the memorandum of the United States of America that the Soviet Government is delaying the return to their homeland of approximately 200,000 Japanese soldiers is a trifling slanderous attack and strikes only slanderers.

As far as the remarks in the memorandum of the United States of America that the Soviet Union participated only 6 days in the war with Japan and that the role of the military efforts of the Soviet Union in this war were allegedly insignificant are concerned, the Soviet Union considers it necessary to state the following: first, the Soviet Union entered the war with Japan exactly at the time fixed at the Yalta conference without any delay whatever. Secondly, the Soviet Army

fought a bloody engagement with Japanese troops not for 6 days but in the course of a month, since the Kwantung army continued resistance for a long time in spite of the imperial declaration of capitulation. Thirdly, the Soviet Army smashed 22 Japanese divisions in Manchuria—the main forces of the Japanese Kwantung army, and took about 600,000 Japanese soldiers and officers prisoner. Fourthly, Japan came to capitulation only after the first decisive blow of Soviet troops at the Kwantung army. Fifthly, even before the entry of the U. S. S. R. into the war with Japan, during 1941–45, the U. S. S. R. kept up to 40 divisions on the frontiers with Manchuria and tied up the whole Kwantung army, thus facilitating the operations of China and the United States of America in the war against the Japanese militarists.

All these facts are, of course, known to the Government of the United States of America, and if, despite these facts, the Government of the United States of America permits itself to minimize the leading role of the Soviet Union in the matter of the defeat of Japanese militarism, this can only be explained by the fact that the Government of the United States of America does not have any convincing arguments, in view of which it is obliged in this case to resort to slanderous fabrications against the U. S. S. R.

## 2. Concerning Preparation of an Over-all Peace Treaty with Japan instead of a Separate Treaty.

In addition to the comments on the draft treaty made above, the Soviet Government has in view the expressing of other remarks on the substance of this draft when the meeting of interested countries takes place.

(a) In its memorandum of May 19 the Government of the United States of America has refrained from answering the comments of the Soviet Government where the text of the Potsdam Agreement was cited, from which it is evident that the Council of Foreign Ministers is set up with a composition of the Five Powers—United States of America, U. S. S. R., China, Great Britain, and France—first of all for “preparatory work on a peace settlement” and that in the drafting of the corresponding peace treaties “the Council will consist of members representing those states which have signed surrender terms dictated to that enemy state which the given task concerns.”

In the meantime, the references to the Potsdam Agreement cited furnish the basis for drawing the following indisputable conclusions:

First, in setting up the Council of Foreign Ministers composed of the Five Powers, “preparatory work on a peace settlement” was directly mentioned as its main task, moreover the peace settlement was not limited to Europe;

Secondly, the Council of Foreign Ministers should engage on its preparatory work on a peace settlement with a composition of members “representing those states which have signed capitula-

tion terms,” from which it follows that the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan is placed upon four countries—the United States of America, U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and China, which signed the Japanese surrender document.

Consequently, fulfillment of the Potsdam Agreement with respect to preparation of a peace treaty with Japan requires the calling of the Council of Foreign Ministers composed of representatives of the United States of America, U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and China and objection to this on the part of the Government of the United States of America is without grounds.

The unfounded nature of the objections against calling a Council of Foreign Ministers for such reasons as that it could allegedly delay preparations of a peace treaty with Japan is likewise perfectly obvious. These objections have already been put forth for several years past and they have led only to dragging out the matter. Meanwhile preparation of the treaty could already have been finished during this time, and the treaty could have been signed, as took place duly with the peace treaties of five other states—Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Finland, which were prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The statement that the procedure of the Council would accord a “secondary role” to some allied states is also without substance. It is sufficient to point out that under the procedure being imposed by the Government of the United States of America all allied states are in reality excluded from preparation of the treaty since the Government of the United States of America has gone along the path of seizing this matter exclusively into its own hands.

(b) In its remarks of May 7 the Soviet Government emphasized the inadmissibility of excluding China from the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan. These Chinese people were obliged to wage a long and heavy war with militaristic Japan, which had invaded its territory, and bore uniquely great sacrifices in this struggle, and therefore the government of the Chinese People's Republic as the sole legal expression of will of the Chinese people cannot be excluded from preparation of a treaty which should serve to establish lasting peace in the Far East. The statement of the government of the Chinese People's Republic of May 22, 1951, confirms its legal right and unique interest in the preparation of the treaty, which other states cannot ignore.

In the meantime the American draft treaty and the memorandum of the United States of America of May 19 testify to the fact that the Government of the United States of America is going on with direct violation of the national rights of China with respect to its territory in refusing to fulfill the Cairo agreement regarding the return of Taiwan island and the Pescadores Islands to China, as well as with exclusion of China from preparation of a peace treaty with Japan.

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In rejecting the established procedure for preparation of peace treaties, the Government of the United States of America is endeavoring to exclude the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union and also other interested countries from preparation of the treaty and, ignoring their legal rights and interests, intends to dictate terms of treaty to Japan in accordance with its own judgment, inasmuch as the Japanese Government, which is dependent upon American occupation authorities, is prepared to enter into such an arrangement with the United States of America.

All this speaks for the fact that the Government of the United States of America does not want Japan to have a peace treaty with all the states that were in a state of war with her. Instead of an over-all peace treaty the United States of America wants to impose upon Japan a separate peace treaty with the Government of the United States of America and its satellites.

It cannot be considered accidental that the Government of the United States of America does not want an over-all peace treaty with Japan, but aspires to a separate treaty. Only with conclusion of a separate treaty can the United States of America secure the dependence of Japan for several years hence, and inasmuch as the conclusion of a military agreement between the United States of America and Japan is also envisaged by the draft treaty it becomes clear that the goal of the separate treaty is the transformation of Japan into a shameful weapon for carrying out the aggressive plans of the United States of America in the Far East.

If the Government of the United States of America does not desist from its intention to exclude the Soviet Union and Chinese People's Republic from the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan and imposes a separate peace treaty on Japan, this will signify, first, that the United States has taken the path of gross violations of its international obligations, including the United Nations Declaration of Jan. 1, 1942, which imposes the obligation not to conclude a separate peace, and, secondly, that the present policy of the United States of America will lead not to restoration and strengthening of peace in the Far East but to the creation of a new aggressive grouping in the Pacific Ocean.

Responsibility for the consequences of such a policy will lie entirely on the Government of the United States of America.

(c) As far as the repeated statement of the Government of the United States of America that negotiations concerning the draft peace treaty with Japan took place between representatives of the U.S.S.R. and United States of America is concerned, the Soviet Government is obliged again to emphasize that there have not been and could not be any negotiations concerning the working out of a draft peace treaty, since the Government of the U.S.S.R. has stood and does stand

against any form of separate negotiations on this question. Of course, personal meetings have taken place between Jacob A. Malik and Dulles at the personal request of Dulles, as have also the transmittal by Dulles of his ideas concerning a peace treaty with Japan and the posing of questions by Malik for clarification of Dulles' views. However, it would be absolutely incorrect to consider such personal meetings as negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America concerning the working out of a peace treaty with Japan.

*3. Fully confirming its proposals of May 7, the Soviet Government insists on the following basic principles with respect to a peace treaty with Japan.*

*First.* The peace treaty with Japan should be over-all and not separate, for which purpose no country participating in the war with Japan should be excluded from the preparation and signing of the treaty.

*Second.* The peace treaty with Japan should be worked out on the basis of the Cairo declaration, the Potsdam declaration and the Yalta Agreement.

*Third.* A peace conference of representatives of all states which participated with their armed forces in the war with Japan should be called in July or August, 1951, for consideration of the available drafts for a peace treaty with Japan.

#### **U.S. Memorandum of July 9**

*[Released to the press July 14]*

*Following is the text of a memorandum delivered to the Soviet Embassy at Washington on July 9, 1951, in response to the Soviet Memorandum of June 10 concerning a Japanese Peace treaty.*

The Department of State, having transmitted to the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington a revised (July 3, 1951) draft of a prospective Treaty of Peace with Japan, takes this occasion to allude to the memorandum of the Government of the Soviet Union of June 10, 1951, dealing with the earlier draft of March 29, 1951.

Section 1 of that memorandum dealt with the substantive terms of that draft. It failed to cite any language of the draft as objectionable. In essence, the Soviet memorandum objected not to anything contained in the draft treaty but because the treaty would not restrict Japan with respect to the right of individual or collective self-defense, a right recognized by the United Nations Charter as "inherent." The Government of the Soviet Union would have the peace treaty deny to Japan the right hereafter to enter into collective security arrangements with other countries of its choosing. This is a viewpoint which the Government of the United States cannot accept.

Section 2 of the Soviet memorandum dealt with procedure. It again "insists on observance of the Potsdam Agreement" which, according to the Government of the Soviet Union, means that "preparation of a peace treaty with Japan is placed upon four countries—the United States of America, U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and China" constituting the Council of Foreign Ministers.

This would commit the preparation of the treaty to the veto-bound processes of that Council and would exclude from the preparatory work France and many Pacific and Asiatic countries which bore a far heavier burden in the Japanese war than did the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government's memorandum does not attempt any reasoned reply to the analysis of the Potsdam Agreement contained in Section I of the United States aide memoire of May 19, which proves irrefutably that the Potsdam Agreement between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States neither mentions nor relates in any way to the Japanese peace, probably because the Potsdam Agreement was made on August 1, 1945, before Japan's surrender and when the Soviet Union was still a neutral in the Pacific war.

In the concluding Section 3 of its memorandum of June 10, 1951, the Soviet Government says that the "peace treaty with Japan should be multi-lateral and not separate" both as to preparation and as to signing.

The July 3, 1951, draft reflects the operation of those very principles. Many interested nations have participated in its preparation. The fact that they have done so through diplomatic channels makes their participation no less real than if they had participated in some other manner. The terms of the treaty would recognize and protect equally the legitimate interests of each and every state which took part in the Japanese war. At the same time the terms embody not merely the formality of peace, but the spirit of peace. The Government of the Soviet Union will further observe that, as it desires, the text is prepared as a multilateral instrument.

The Soviet Memorandum, after having first demanded that the preparation of a draft treaty should now be started over again by the Council of Foreign Ministers, suggests, in its final paragraph, that when there are available drafts, there should be a conference of all active belligerents in the Japanese war, for consideration of these drafts.

The Government of the United States anticipates that there will be a general conference early in September to conclude a peace on the basis of the draft of July 3, 1951. It will welcome participation in that conference, and adherence to the resultant Treaty, by the Government of the Soviet Union.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington.

## U.S.S.R. Fails To Inform Soviet Peoples of Friendship Resolution

[Released to the press July 14]

The Voice of America today began calling to the attention of the Soviet Government its failure to transmit the McMahon-Ribicoff Friendship Resolution to the Soviet peoples.

For the next several days the Voice of America will stress in all Russian language programs the number of days that have elapsed since July 7, when President Truman forwarded the Friendship Resolution to the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

The first of this series of basic scripts follows:

### TRUMAN MESSAGE NOT PUBLISHED IN U.S.S.R.

Good Evening. This is \_\_\_\_\_. On July 7, President Truman sent a message to His Excellency Nikolai Mikhailovich Shvernik, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It was a simple request. That those who head the Soviet Union transmit to the people of the Soviet Union, a resolution passed by the elected representatives of the American people, the Congress, expressing to them the feeling of friendship. To date, there is no evidence that the President's request has been complied with.

The Resolution of Friendship has appeared in no Soviet newspaper; it has not been heard on any Soviet radio; nor has any Stalin prize winning actor stepped to the footlights to read it to his audience. Of course, there may be a delay—papers, letters, books, articles of all kinds have to go through a great many hands in the Soviet Union before seeing the light of day. Or, perhaps, it is being studied, as the diplomats say, but what there is to study about a simple expression of friendship from 150 million people it is difficult to understand. Or, perhaps, the Resolution itself isn't phrased correctly—after all, phraseology in the Soviet Union is a special science—but then it would be such a simple matter just to telephone Washington and ask for the definition or meaning of any word. For instance, if there's any difficulty with the American word "friendship" the word "comradeship" could be substituted. If it's difficult to telephone out of Moscow—I hear there are difficulties sometimes—Ambassador Kirk is right at hand, and he is an excellent grammarian.

But if it is none of these things—the nonappearance of the American people's resolution in any Soviet media, the ignoring of its President's simple request—is exceedingly strange, and we must look elsewhere for the reasons. Perhaps it's in the body, the actual words, in the Resolution itself.

Now let's see—it says "The deepest wish of America is to join with all other nations in preserving the dignity of man, and in observing those moral principles which alone lend meaning to his existence . . ."

Now, what could be in there that wouldn't translate. I'm sure there are Russian phrases equivalent to "the dignity of man" and for "moral principles." If not in the new rapidly changing Soviet language, then back a little in the old Russian. And, there would be enough citizens who still understand the old phrases to be able to convey their meaning to the younger folk.

What else is in the Resolution? Oh yes—that "the American people offer to share all that is good in atomic energy, asking in return only safeguards against the evil in the atom." That would translate, I'm sure, for everybody in the new Russian; after all, the atom is much younger than the Soviet Union itself. No—they could

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understand that part; it wouldn't be that section that would keep it out of the newspapers.

What about the part which says "the goal of the American people is now, and ever has been, a just and lasting peace." No—that's not it. That translates into any language, just as it is.

"That the American people and their Government desire neither war with the Soviet Union nor the terrible consequences of such a war . . ." Well, that may be a little difficult, seeing as how Soviet typesetters have not set these words up in such a sequence for so long a time—but no, that can't be it; it would take a little practice, perhaps, but they could get it right.

Ah, here is a difficult passage—"the American people deeply regret the artificial barriers which separates them from the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and which keep the Soviet peoples from learning the desire of the American people to live in friendship with all other peoples . . ."—Yes, that might be it; there's a difficult word to translate in there—I mean in the modern Russian—the word "barrier." I admit that it's hard for—not the Soviet people—but the pedants of bureaucracy to find a word for "barrier." There is a word, or two words, "stockade" is one, or "barbed wire" is another—these are in use, but they are actual things, actual barriers. The Soviet people will understand that perhaps the difficulty is with the word "artificial." Maybe that's it. I don't know.

But, as I said before, there's the telephone or Ambassador Kirk right at hand for difficult translation problems. Outside of this, I can't understand why the President's request has so long been ignored. Here in America, if we were to receive such a request from Generalissimo Stalin, for instance, every librarian, professor, Russian speaking editor would immediately be at work. The message would appear in every newspaper in a matter of hours. But then, if the Russian people were to send us the real message in their hearts, perhaps it would be more easily translatable into English . . . and now, this is ———, saying goodby, look for the message, and see you again.

## Soviet Action on Lend-Lease Urged

[Released to the press July 6]

*The following are the texts of two notes sent by Secretary Acheson on July 2, 1951, to the Soviet Chargé at Washington, Boris I. Karavaev, one concerning Soviet failure to reply to the United States demand of April 6 that all lend-lease vessels be immediately returned, the second noting that no reply has been received to the United States proposal for arbitration of the question of a financial settlement of the lend-lease account:*

### I

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and refers to the request of the Government of the United States in its note of February 7, 1951 and reiterated in its note of April 6, 1951 that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics promptly return to the United States all vessels loaned to the Soviet Union under the terms of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942.

In view of the clear and undeniable obligation of the Soviet Government under Article V of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement to return these vessels, immediate notification of the intentions of the Soviet Government with respect to this matter is requested.

### II

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and refers to the proposal of the Government of the United States, as set forth in its note of April 27, 1951, that there be submitted to arbitration the question of what would be fair and reasonable terms of financial settlement by the Soviet Government for the lend-lease articles having civilian utility except ships, which were not lost, destroyed or consumed during the war and which are not returned to the United States.

In view of the extended period of time which has elapsed without response from the Soviet Government, the Government of the United States expresses the hope that the Soviet Government will promptly reply to the proposal of April 27, 1951.

## Estate Tax Convention With Switzerland Signed

[Released to the press July 9]

On July 9, Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, and Charles Bruggmann, Swiss Minister in Washington, signed a convention between the United States and Switzerland for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on estates and inheritances.

The estate-tax convention with Switzerland is basically similar to, and has the same objectives as, estate-tax conventions now in force between the United States and Canada, France, and the United Kingdom and such conventions concluded but not yet in force between the United States and Greece, Ireland, Norway, and the Union of South Africa. As applied to the taxes imposed in the United States, the convention with Switzerland deals solely with the Federal estate taxes and does not affect the estate or inheritance taxes imposed by the several states, territories, or possessions of the United States or the District of Columbia.

The convention will be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. It is provided in the convention that instruments of ratification shall be exchanged and that the convention shall become effective on the day that exchange takes place, but shall be applicable only to estates or inheritances in the case of persons who die on or after that date.



## Agreement With India For Relief Supplies

[Released to the press July 9]

An agreement to facilitate the movement and distribution of packages and supplies donated for relief and rehabilitation in India was signed today at the Department of State by Madame Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, the Indian Ambassador, and Secretary Acheson.

The agreement applies to certain foods, medical supplies, hospital equipment, and agricultural implements shipped to India under an amendment to the India Emergency Food Aid Act of 1951. This amendment authorizes the administrator for economic cooperation to pay the ocean freight charges on these types of supplies when donated through organizations qualified as voluntary non-profit relief agencies under applicable Eca regulations and registered for operations in India with the Department of State's Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid.

According to the terms of the agreement signed today, the Government of India will allow duty-free entry and defray the inland transportation charges on the relief supplies mentioned above. These actions, by materially reducing the cost of handling shipments, will increase considerably the effectiveness of the distribution of the gifts donated by the American people through the relief agencies.

## Norway Signs Torquay Protocol

[Released to the press July 9]

The United States Government has been informed by the headquarters of the United Nations that the Government of Norway, on July 3, 1951, signed the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The terms of the protocol require that the concessions negotiated between the United States and Norway at the recent tariff conference at Torquay, England, but which have heretofore been withheld, be put into effect on the thirtieth day—August 2, 1951—after Norway's signature of the instrument.

At Torquay, Norway granted substantial concessions on its imports of both agricultural and nonagricultural products of the United States. More than half of these concessions were reductions in duty; the remainder consisted of binding of existing duties or duty-free treatment.

Norwegian duties were reduced on fresh apples and pears; dried apricots, prunes, apples, peaches, pears, and other fruits; and various vegetable juices. Present moderate duties on lard were bound; duty-free status of soybeans was bound.

Duty-free treatment of ash lumber was bound, as was the moderate rate of duty on certain types of plywood.

Concessions were granted on various chemical products, on lubricating oil, and on petrolatum. There were duty reductions on tractors and a wide range of machinery and tools. Present duties on aircraft parts were bound. In addition to the concessions directly negotiated with the United States at Torquay, Norway made numerous concessions to other countries on products of interest to United States exporters.

Among the products to which United States concessions initially negotiated with Norway apply are: special types of canned sardines and herrings and certain other fish products; certain kinds of cheeses; reindeer meat; chrome or chromium metal and certain other metals and metal alloys; certain artificial abrasives; certain chemical pigments; fish hooks; and certain kinds of paper.

The specific United States concessions which will be put into effect as a result of Norway's signature of the Torquay Protocol will be announced as soon as possible.

## WHO American Office Opens Nursing Workshop In Guatemala

[Released to the press by the U.N. Department of Public Information June 28]

A nursing workshop on the principles of supervision and administration in communicable disease nursing opens on Sunday, July 1, in Guatemala City, under the auspices of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, regional office of the World Health Organization. The workshop is being financed with technical assistance funds by the Organization of American States.

Three bureau specialists in public health nursing and three specialists from Latin America—one from Brazil and two from Chile—are conducting the workshop, a 6-weeks' intensive study course intended for directors, instructors, and supervisors of schools of nursing and public health services. It will operate July 1 through August 12 and is designed to serve nurses from the six Central American Republics and Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Mexico. Two nurses in positions of leadership from each of the 10 countries have been invited to attend as students.

The Government of Guatemala is housing the workshop meetings in its new school of nursing, a completed unit on the grounds of a thousand-bed hospital now under construction in the capital city of the Republic. The Government is also contributing personnel, services, and facilities for the course.

## **U.S., Australia, New Zealand Negotiate Security Treaty**

### **STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR DULLES CONSULTANT TO THE SECRETARY**

*[Released to the press July 12]*

During the latter part of February 1951, I had several days of discussion at Canberra, Australia, with Mr. Spender, then the Foreign Minister of Australia, and Mr. Doidge, the Foreign Minister of New Zealand. We explored the possibility of an arrangement between our three countries, pursuant to the United Nations Charter, which would make clear that, in the event of an armed attack on any of them in the Pacific, each of the three would act to meet the common danger.

After I had reported our conclusions to President Truman, he asked the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and me as his special representative, to pursue this matter further.

This has been done and has resulted in the negotiation of a proposed security treaty for consideration by the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America. This is the draft now being made public.

As said by President Truman in his statement of April 19, 1951, this arrangement between our three Governments is one of a series of arrangements, described in the preamble to the draft treaty, now being worked out by the United States to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific. These arrangements on which we are now working are, in turn, as the President said in his April 19 statement only "initial steps." It is expected that, in due course, these initial steps will be followed by others in order to achieve what the preamble and article VIII of the draft treaty describes as "the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area."

It is expected that this treaty will be signed at about the same time as the signing of the Japanese peace treaty. There has not yet been any final decision as to the place or precise date of signing.

I am very happy to join with Ambassadors Spender and Berendsen in announcing the results of our discussions. It has been a great pleasure to work with both of them and with other officials of the Australian and New Zealand Governments. I am confident that what we have done will be an important step on the road to peace.

### **STATEMENT BY PERCY C. SPENDER AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR TO U.S.**

*[Released to the press July 12]*

The end of the negotiations which have resulted in the initialling for identification, on behalf of the three countries concerned, of this draft security agreement marks the beginning not only of a new and important relationship between our three countries in the Pacific but a historic occasion of profound significance to the free world.

For too long this part of the world has not received the attention which its growing importance merited. This draft agreement which will be formally signed at an agreed and not distant date is but one but nonetheless an exceedingly important step in building up the security of the Pacific area. Based upon mutuality of interest and obligation what in substance it does is to recognize that any armed attack on one of the parties is an armed attack on all and obligates the others to come to the assistance of the party attacked.

Based upon the close and intimate understanding which already exists between the three countries, an understanding which was fortified and developed by the great comradeship which arose between the men of the three countries in the perilous days of the last conflict, Australia, dedicated to the cause of peace, is happy to join in this great association of free peoples and confidently faces the future in the firm knowledge that we stand together.

I would like to record how much the Australian Government appreciates the great labours which have been put in the negotiations by Mr. Dulles and the officials associated with him. The splendid consultations which have taken place between us is a happy augury for the progress of this proposed agreement. At all times he and his associates have been frank, reasonable, and prepared to see a different point of view.

My own satisfaction in being so intimately associated with these negotiations is I hope understandable. But merely as an Australian I know I speak for my countrymen when I say that the successful conclusion of these negotiations will be warmly hailed by Australia.

**STATEMENT BY CARL BERENDSEN  
NEW ZEALAND AMBASSADOR TO U.S.**

*[Released to the press July 12]*

It is my privilege to initial this draft treaty on behalf of New Zealand, and I wish to pay my tribute to the invaluable assistance rendered in this matter by John Foster Dulles and his associates.

These proposals appear to me to meet the essential requirements of all useful international engagements in that they conform with an existing situation, with the facts and the necessities of the time and the area. On completion, this pact will formally record what so clearly and happily exists today—the close relation between the interests of the parties in the Pacific, the warmth of the regard of their peoples one for the other, their common desire for peace, and their common intention to resist aggression. And this pact when completed will be more than a piece of paper—it will be an engagement between three parties who, in the defence of liberty, have in the past fought side by side on many a hard-won field; who know and respect each other's character and capacity; who trust each other in all circumstances; and who have proved their determination and their ability at all times to honour their pledged word.

I believe that this treaty, when concluded, will be entirely in conformity with the aims, the ideals and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; that it will prove a useful measure to maintain and preserve peace in the Pacific; and that it will be of real and lasting benefit to all its signatories and indeed to the world.

**TEXT OF DRAFT TRIPARTITE SECURITY TREATY**

*[For consideration by the Governments of  
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States  
of America]*

*[Released to the press July 12]*

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,

Noting that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan area,

Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense

of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

Therefore declare and agree as follows:

**ARTICLE I**

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

**ARTICLE II**

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

**ARTICLE III**

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

**ARTICLE IV**

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

**ARTICLE V**

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

**ARTICLE VI**

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

**ARTICLE VII**

The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

**ARTICLE VIII**

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.



#### ARTICLE IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the signatories have been deposited.

#### ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.

#### ARTICLE XI

This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE at \_\_\_\_\_ this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_ 1951.

### TCA Adopts Plan For Use Of American Science Books

*[Released to the press July 9]*

Adoption of a plan for the selective use of American scientific and technical books in the Point Four Program was announced today by Dr. Henry G. Bennett, Technical Cooperation Administrator.

The plan was worked out in cooperation with the American Book Publishers Council, Inc., American Textbook Publishers Institute, and American Association of University Presses, representing the principal book publishers in the United States. It calls for the distribution of American scientific and technical books on a limited scale by American technicians engaged in Point Four projects in other countries. The books will be presented to ministries, institutions, and individual technicians of the other countries with whom the American technicians are working. In all cases, the books will be presented only when it is determined that such works printed in English can be used to advantage and will contribute to the furtherance of the Point Four Program. Dr. Bennett said:

We recognize that American scientific and technical books can be a valuable means of sharing our knowledge with other peoples. In fact, the distribution of such books is one of the most effective ways of disseminating scientific and technical knowledge which other people will find useful in increasing their productivity, developing their economic resources, and improving their standards of living.

At the same time, we want to make sure that every book purchased with Point Four funds will serve a practical purpose. Therefore we are adopting this plan for limited distribution of such books by American technicians who will select specific titles for presentation to the scientists and technicians with whom they are working directly in other countries.

Dr. Bennett pointed out that in many countries in which the Point Four Program operates, many individuals and institutions that can use scientific and technical books in English have very limited dollar funds for such purposes.

The selective distribution of such books under the Point Four Program will be coordinated both in the United States and in other countries with the general book distribution program being carried on as part of the foreign information and educational exchange program operated by the Department of State.

### Point Four Administrator Visits Ethiopia

*[Released to the press July 10]*

Technical Cooperation Administrator Henry G. Bennett left Washington July 9 for a 2-week visit to Ethiopia to consult with Ethiopian authorities on the program of technical cooperation under a Point Four General Agreement signed June 14, 1951. Dr. Bennett is accompanied by Benjamin H. Hardy, director of the Public Affairs Staff of the TCA.

Dr. Bennett served as agricultural adviser to Emperor Haile Selassie in the spring of 1950. Many of the projects which now come under the Point Four Program in Ethiopia are the results of recommendations he made following his studies of the Ethiopian economy.

The Point Four Administrator said that the technical cooperative plan includes the establishment of an agricultural college staffed by American technicians and teaching the most modern rural practices in their adaptation to local conditions. Other projects are for aid to primary and secondary schools, including the establishment of an Ethiopian-American educational service separate from the Ministry of Education in undertaking teacher training work with materials prepared in the United States under the direction of American educators.

Dr. Bennett said that the last time he was in Ethiopia he saw evidences of great potential development. He stated:

Huge sources of untapped hydroelectric power are there. These will be studied by United States and Ethiopian experts with the view toward harnessing them to the development of other resources.

I saw countless herds of cattle, a potential source of meat for Europe and income to the Ethiopians. Yet the lack of packing plants, and refrigerated transportation deny the benefit of this great industry both to Europe and Ethiopia.

The TCA administrator also declared that conferences will be held with Ethiopian Government officials and members of the United States Embassy in Addis Ababa for the purpose of discussing other projects on which Ethiopia has requested assistance under the Point Four Program.

## U.S. Signs Defense Agreements With Saudi Arabia

[Released to the press July 13]

The United States Government signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and Dhahran Air Field agreements with the Saudi Arabian Government at Jidda on June 18, 1951.

The Mutual Defense Assistance Program agreement was concluded following the designation of Saudi Arabia as eligible for cash reimbursable military assistance under Public Law 329, as amended. This act provides such assistance may be extended any nation whose ability to defend itself or to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part is important to the security of the United States. Saudi Arabia is the first Arab country so designated. The United States is prepared to provide military training in the use of the equipment to be purchased by the Saudi Arabian Government in order that Saudi Arabia may maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense, or participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part. The Saudi Arabian Government agrees not to undertake any act of aggression against another state.

The Dhahran Air Field Agreement is for a period of 5 years with provision of renewal for a similar period. The complete title to and sovereignty over the Dhahran Air Field by the Saudi Arabian Government is safeguarded, but the United States Government is permitted to use the field for the maintenance, repair, and other technical services of United States Government aircraft. The training of Saudi Arabian students in airfield maintenance and operation will be continued under the new agreement.

## Department Confirms Suspension of Two Foreign Service Officers

[Released to the press July 12]

The Department of State confirmed today the suspension from duty of John Patton Davies, Jr., and Oliver Edmund Clubb, career officers of the Foreign Service. The Department made it known that Davies and Clubb had been suspended on June 27 as the result of recommendations by the Department's Loyalty Security Board that hearings be held by the Board on both cases. In emphasizing that the Department's suspension action is mandatory under Public Law 733, the statute which governs the Department's security procedures, it was explained that the Department is required to suspend any employee when it has been determined that security charges should be preferred and formal hearings conducted. Suspension, it was pointed out, does not indicate

that a person is guilty of misconduct or is a security risk; but suspension is a mandatory legal requirement (PL 733) in any case in which a hearing is held. The Department made it clear that the purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the complete facts and thus hearings are for the protection of both the Government and the individual.

The Department stated that the date of hearing of Davies' case before the State Department Loyalty Security Board has been set as July 23 and the date on Clubb's case as July 31. The chairman of this Board is Conrad E. Snow, wartime Army General and former secretary of the New Hampshire Bar Association.

It was stated that the Department would make no further comment upon the two cases until the cases are completely adjudicated.

## Department of State Conducts Seminar on Foreign Affairs

[Released to the press July 11]

Ten outstanding young men and women, representing that many different colleges and universities throughout the Nation, are now attending the Graduate Student Summer Seminar on Foreign Affairs conducted by the Department of State.

The seminar is designed to give the academic circles of the country a more comprehensive picture of the State Department's role in the conduct of foreign affairs. It will provide an opportunity for students at the graduate level to undertake or continue certain types of studies or projects in which the Department is concerned and to experience at first hand some of the day to day operations of the Department.

Classes began July 10 in the Foreign Service Institute where members of the 2-month course gathered to hear top flight specialists from all areas of the Department. The seminar was officially launched with a welcome from Walter K. Scott, deputy assistant secretary for administration.

The 8-week program will be concluded September 1.

One-hundred twelve colleges and universities participated in the Nation-wide program by nominating candidates on the basis of individual interests in international relations as well as scholastic and leadership merit. A similar type program has been offered for the past 2 years. This, however, is the first time it has been possible to offer financial assistance to the participants. The funds are provided jointly by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Department of State.

Members of the seminar course are classified as temporary employees of the Department.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MEETINGS

### Documents Relating to the Armistice Negotiations in Korea

#### U.N. Communiqué Issued July 11

The second meeting of the armistice negotiations convened in the vicinity of Kaesong, Korea, at 10 a. m., today, 11 July 1951, Wednesday [8 p. m., Tuesday, eastern daylight time].

The principal delegates of both negotiating parties were the same as for the first meeting. Vice Admiral Joy, United States Navy, was the senior United Nations Command delegate, and General Nam Il, North Korean Army, was the senior Communist delegate.

It was evident to all United Nations Command delegates that the Communists exhibited less stiffness and were less formal than on the previous day. This atmosphere permitted a better understanding between the negotiating parties.

One of the delays in conducting and expediting these negotiations is the difficulty inherent in the language barrier. Considerable time was spent on the part of both negotiating delegations in assuring themselves that they had correctly interpreted and understood the statements of the other parties.

Today, the agenda items were more thoroughly explored and discussed by both parties and there now exists a better understanding of the intended scope by all concerned.

There still exist some differences of opinion regarding the priority of items for the agenda.

Certain administrative agreements were reached including the relaxation of certain restrictions on movement and arrangement for mutual communication facilities.

Today's negotiations adjourned shortly after 4 p. m. There is a general feeling among United Nations delegates to the armistice negotiations that progress is being made.

The delegation for the next meeting will include approximately 20 news media representatives. They will be permitted within the area of the negotiations but will not be allowed to enter the conference room.

#### U.N. Memorandum of July 12

At the first meeting with the Communist delegation, Admiral Joy proposed the admission of newsmen to the vicinity of the conference. His proposal was that 20 selected newsmen be permitted to move to and from the conference area as a part of the United Nations Command delegation. He emphasized that they would not be admitted to the conference room but only to the area of the conference.

General Nam Il at first accepted this proposal but later reversed his decision, saying that he communicated the question to his Supreme Commander. Until he receives the answer he would like to postpone the matter. Admiral Joy stated that his liaison officer would go to Kaesong at 7:30 a. m. July 11 to get their reply.

At that time, Col. J. C. Murray, U.S.M.C., landed in a helicopter on the landing strip at Kaesong to receive the Communist reply.

He was met at the airstrip on arrival by Lt. Col. Chai Chengwan, Chinese Communist forces, and his interpreter, Pi Shi-lung. Colonel Chai stated he was instructed to advise:

Since the conference at the present stage is still strictly a military one, and even the agenda has not been agreed upon, our Supreme Commander considers that it is not the time yet for the press to come in. However, we are still considering this matter.

Admiral Joy, on the second day of the conference, again raised the question of the press, stating that the United Nations Command delegation desired the presence of professional newsmen at the site of the conference.

The United Nations Command delegation [Admiral Joy said], on instruction of the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, must therefore insist that newsmen be admitted to the area of this conference without further delay.

General Nam Il replied that the meeting was being held under war conditions and that the agenda had not been agreed upon and the Com-



munist delegation did not consider the presence of newsmen desirable at this time.

At a later time, Admiral Joy again raised the question and General Nam Il replied:

I don't mean to say I refuse the newspapermen to come to the conference site area, but for the time being the matter must be reserved.

Toward the end of the session, Admiral Joy stated he had received a dispatch from the Commander in Chief United Nations Command, which he read:

I desire that you inform the Communist delegates as follows—The presence of a selected number of newsmen at a conference of such major importance to the entire world is considered an inherent right by members of the United Nations. Therefore, a selected group of professional newsmen, photographers and newsreel cameramen, numbering approximately twenty, will accompany and be an integral part of the United Nations Command delegation to any and all future sessions beginning 12 July.

Thereupon, Admiral Joy informed the Communist delegation that if, by tomorrow morning, newsmen are still unacceptable at the site of the conference, it is requested that we be informed by 7:30 a. m. tomorrow on what date it will be possible to resume the conference with newsmen present at the conference site.

Communications by liaison officers meeting at a half-way point between the Imjin River and Kaesong were agreed upon. At 7:30 a. m., 12 July, Col. J. C. Murray, in company with an interpreter, landed at the enemy outpost at Panmunjon to receive the answer of the enemy delegation. The spokesman of the enemy delegation was a captain of the North Korean Army who stated:

I have been instructed by our senior delegate to inform you formally with regard to the question of correspondents that we are in favor of having newsmen from both sides come to Kaesong at the opportune time.

When agreement is reached on our negotiations we shall welcome newsmen to come here to do their press coverage. We wish that we can state a definite date and we hope that such a date will arrive very soon, but this depends on the efforts made by both sides during the conference and cannot be determined by our side alone.

Colonel Murray replied:

On the assumption that you would not allow the conference to be delayed over the issue of admitting 20 newsmen to the conference area we placed our convoy on the road to arrive on time to prepare for the conference at 9 a. m. This convoy includes 20 newsmen. If you refuse the convoy permission to proceed, the officer in charge has been directed to return to our lines.

The convoy reached the enemy outpost at 8:37 a. m. An armed guard stopped the convoy and noted the presence of the accompanying newsmen. The Communist officer in charge refused to permit the convoy to proceed with correspondents as an integral part.

Captain McAllister, the convoy commander, stated that he would wait until 9:30 a. m., at which time, if his complete convoy, including the 20 newsmen, had not been passed, he would return

to the lines of the United Nations Command. At 9:30 a. m., the enemy outpost having received no additional instructions, the convoy returned to the positions of the United Nations forces.

#### **Message to Vice Admiral Joy from the Chief Communist Delegate, July 13**

Vice Admiral Joy, United States Navy.

"I have received your letter. The following is my answer:

1. We did not stop your group of delegates from coming to the meeting at 0746 12 July. Since we have not agreed concerning correspondents who had come along in the vehicles, naturally we could not allow them to come into the area of our meeting. It is without reason that your group of delegates refused to come to the meeting because of this.

2. Our opinion on the problem of news reporters and representatives of the press is that neither side's news reporters or news representatives can come into the area of the meeting until both sides have agreed.

3. We proposed that the meeting will be continued at 0900 today.

GENERAL NAM IL,  
*Senior Delegate, Korean People's Army.  
Chinese People's Volunteer Delegation.*

0600 13 July, 1951

#### **U.N. Commander's Message to the Communist Delegates, July 13**

*General Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander in Chief United Nations Forces, transmitted the following message over the Armed Forces Radio:*

To Gen. KIM IL SUNG and Gen. PENG TEH-HUAI:

In my initial message to you on 30 June I proposed that representatives meet aboard a Danish hospital ship. I suggested this site since it would have afforded equal freedom of access to both parties, including any elements such as newsmen associated with the party. It would have provided a completely neutral atmosphere free of the menacing presence of armed troops of either side. It would have provided equal communication facilities of all kinds.

Your reply to my message made no reference to my proposed meeting place. Instead you proposed Kaesong. In the interest of expediting the end of bloodshed and to demonstrate the good faith under which the United Nations Command was proceeding, I accepted Kaesong as the site for our discussion.

In so doing, I expected the conditions referred to above, vital to the success of any such discussion, would be afforded at Kaesong. In order to provide further assurances that such conditions would

in fact exist at the conference site, my liaison officers in their initial meeting with yours on 8 July proposed that a ten-mile-wide corridor centered on the Kumchon-Kaesong Munsan road and limited by Kumchon on the north and Munsan on the south be established as a neutral zone free of any hostile action by either party.

They further recommended that United Nations forces within this corridor remain south of an east-west line to the south edge of Kaesong while your forces within this corridor remained north of an east-west line to the north edge of Kaesong, leaving the town of Kaesong restricted to entry only by those individuals in the delegation party.

Agreement on this proposal would have assured freedom of movement to both delegations to and from the meetings and within the town of Kaesong. However, your liaison officers declined to agree to this proposal, stating that it was not needed to insure satisfactory conditions at the conference site for both delegations. To show good faith and avoid delay I accepted your assurances instead of my proposal to establish a neutral zone. Since the opening of the conference it has been evident that the equality of treatment so essential to the conduct of armistice negotiations is lacking. Since the first meeting at Kaesong your delegation has placed restrictions on movement of our delegation. It has subjected our personnel to the close proximity of your armed guard. It has delayed and blocked passage of our couriers. It has withheld its co-operation in establishment of 2-way communications with our base even though it agreed to do so immediately. It has refused admittance to the conference area certain personnel in our convoy which I desire and for whose conduct I stated I assumed full responsibility. Extension of the present recess and the delay in resuming the conference of our delegation is solely due to those unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions against which my representatives have repeatedly protested.

As pointed out to your representatives by Vice Admiral Joy, my personal representative in the first meeting of 10 July, the hope for success of these discussions rested upon the good faith of both sides. With good faith mutual confidence might be established, an atmosphere of truth created and the attainment of an honorable and enduring settlement brought measurably nearer.

The record of the United Nations Command delegation to date is open for world inspection. It establishes beyond any shadow of doubt their honorable intentions and good faith at every stage of the proceedings. With full and solemn realization of the vital importance of our conference to all the peoples of the world, the United Nations Command delegation is prepared to continue our discussions in the same spirit of good faith at any time that we receive assurance that your delegation will proceed in like spirit.

The assurances which I require are simple and few. They include as primary prerequisites the establishment of an agreed conference area of suitable extent completely free of armed personnel of either side. Each delegation must have complete reciprocity of treatment to include complete and equal freedom of movement to, from and within the agreed conference area and complete and equal freedom at all times in the selection of the personnel in its delegation party to include representatives of the press.

I therefore now propose that a circular area with its center approximately at the center of Kaesong and with a five-mile radius be agreed upon as a neutral zone. The eastern limit of the neutral zone shall be the present point of contact of our forces at Panmunjon. I propose that we both agree to refrain from any hostile acts within this zone during the entire period of our conference. I propose that we agree that the area of the conference site and the roads leading there to use by personnel of both delegation parties be completely free of armed personnel.

I further propose we both agree that the total personnel of each delegation within the neutral area at any time be limited to a maximum of 150. I propose that we agree that the composition of each delegation party within the foregoing limits be subject solely to the determination of its commander. It is understood that personnel to be admitted to the actual conference chamber should be limited to those agreed upon by your representatives and mine.

If you agree to these proposals the present recess can be terminated and the conference resumed without delay and with some expectation of progress. Radio telephone is available to you for communication to me of your reply. If you prefer to send your reply by liaison officer I guarantee his safety within my lines during daylight providing you inform me of the time and route by which he will travel and the manner by which he may be identified.

Should you continue to insist that restrictions are necessary for our personal safety or for any other reason I propose that the conference site be moved to a locality which will afford the few simple assurances I have specified herein.

#### **Communist Delegates' Reply to the U.N. Commander, July 14**

*The following message was broadcast in English over the Peiping radio:*

**General RIDGWAY:**

Your letter dated July 13 has been received. In order to eliminate misunderstanding and arguments over some side questions and to enable the work of peace negotiations to proceed smoothly, we agree to your proposal of fixing the Kaesong area as a neutral zone during the period of the meeting, and that both parties do not carry

out hostile acts of any kind within this area, and all armed personnel be excluded from the area of the meeting place and from the routes through which your delegation and our travel to the area of the meeting place. As to the size of the area of the meeting place and other related concrete questions, we propose that these be left to the delegations of both sides to settle at a single session.

With regard to the question of news reporters, which gave rise to the holding up of the meeting, this has nothing to do with the question of the fixing of a neutral zone. Your delegation never raised the question of fixing of a neutral zone after your liaison officers raised it once on July 8, but the task of the liaison officers was to discuss questions of detail. They had no power to discuss a question of this nature—a question of fixing a neutral zone.

The question of news reporters which gave rise to the present suspension of the meeting is a trifling one. It is not worth while suspending the meeting for this, much less is it worth breaking up the meeting for this. Your delegation had raised this question at the meeting. Our delegation at the time considered that the arrival of news reporters of various countries in Kaesong to be inappropriate, as the meeting had not yet achieved any result and even the agenda had not yet been passed. Thus on this question no agreement was reached.

We insist on the principle that all matters must be agreed upon by both sides before they can be executed. We hold that this principle is fair and irrefutable. Since agreement was not reached on the question of news reporters, your side should not one-sidedly and forcibly put it into operation.

For the sake of preventing the meeting from being suspended for a long time or broken up by this trifle, we now agree to your proposal: to include the 20 news reporters of your side as a part of the personnel of your delegation.

We have already ordered our delegation to provide facilities to your side on this question too.

**KIM IL SUNG**, *Supreme Commander of the Korean Peoples Army*; **PENG TEH-HUAI**, *Commander of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers*.

JULY 14, 1951.

#### **U.N. Communiqué Issued July 15**

The third meeting of the Korean armistice negotiators convened at 2:09 p. m. today, Sunday, 15 July 1951 at the same conference site that has been used for the two previous meetings.

When the helicopters carrying the members of the United Nations Command delegation landed near the conference site, no North Korean or Chinese on guard were apparent.

Admiral Joy, who had traveled to Kaesong by jeep, took the initiative and opened the meeting.

He extended his regrets for being nine minutes late, but stated that the delay was occasioned by actions of sentries in holding up 2 one-quarter ton trucks (jeeps) of his convoy. The admiral's jeep and one other had gone ahead of the convoy in order to arrive at the conference at the scheduled time. Sentries delayed the admiral until the convoy closed. He further stated that he expected no repetition of such an event on the part of the Communist forces.

The senior members of the United Nations Command delegation then elaborated on certain details previously advanced in General Ridgway's message of 13 July and proposed that:

1. The road leading to the conference site of Kaesong shall be open to unrestricted use by vehicles of the United Nations Command delegation. No notice will be required for such movement.

2. The neutral area, five miles in radius, with traffic circle in Kaesong as its center, would contain no armed personnel except the minimum needed for military police purposes. Such personnel could be armed with small arms.

3. Any personnel required for security at the conference site would be unarmed. The conference site would be defined as an area having a radius of one-half mile centered on the conference house.

At 2:22 p. m., General Nam Il, senior Communist delegate, requested a 15-minute recess to discuss with his delegation Admiral Joy's proposals.

At the end of the recess General Nam Il agreed in principle and accepted the United Nations Command proposals. It was suggested and agreed upon, that it would be appropriate for the liaison officers of the two delegations to work out the minute details of establishing the neutral area of the conference.

Significant of the desires of both delegations to get on with the main work of the conference was the complete absence of any controversy over the arrangement for neutrality of the site. The delegation then proceeded for the remainder of the meeting to discuss agenda items.

#### *Supplementary Announcement*

During a meeting of the liaison officers, which immediately followed the negotiation session held between the United Nations Command delegation and the North Korean-Chinese delegation this afternoon at Kaesong, all of the proposals made by Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy relating to the neutrality of the zone for the discussion were reviewed.

No particular problems in implementing the provisions are anticipated and, for the most part, the proposals have already been placed into effect.

Colonel Chang, senior Communist liaison officer, appeared to be very anxious to resolve any future difficulties on a liaison officer level in order that the delegates might not be diverted.



## Twenty-second Report Of U.N. Command Operations In Korea

FOR THE PERIOD MAY 16-31, 1951<sup>1</sup>

U.N. doc. S/2217  
Transmitted June 28, 1951

I herewith submit report No. 22 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 May, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqués numbers 875-905, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

This twenty-second report records a battle cycle characteristic of the current Korean tactical operations, and records also the enemy's most costly reversal since the intervention in Korea of the Chinese Communist Armies in November of last year. The enemy launched the anticipated second phase of his spring offensive on 16 May, committing 21 Chinese Communist force divisions on the 75-mile front from Tokchong to Nodong. By 21 May, the attack had generally passed its climax as United Nations forces exacted heavy casualties at a relatively small cost to themselves. On 19 May a counterattack was launched by forces on the left of the United Nations line followed 2 days later by the counterattack of the remaining United Nations Forces on the right, thus initiating a powerful counteroffensive which, by the end of the month, had thrust the exhausted enemy forces northward 15 to 30 miles. The close of the period found enemy resistance stiffening, and the oppos-

ing forces arrayed in positions approximating those of 1 January, in the vicinity of the 38th parallel. The enemy suffered extremely heavy casualties, for the first time giving up large numbers of Chinese prisoners and losing substantial quantities of weapons and supplies.

The hostile effort was made in two major sectors. Six Chinese Communist force divisions attacked on a 25-mile front in the Yongyang-Kapyong sector in the western part of the front. Having penetrated to a line passing about 3 miles south of Masogu and Munye by 20 May, the enemy drive was contained and then converted into a retreat by counterattacking United Nations forces. Chinese Communist force units fought fairly strong delaying actions near Yongyang on May 24 and 25, and in the Chiam area, about 25 miles north of Munye, from 25-28 May.

The most desperate fighting of the Korean campaign developed in the east central part of the front, in the vicinity of Hangye. Six Chinese Communist force divisions launched a powerful attack against strongly held United Nations lines on a 20-mile front to the north of that town, on 16 May. Though United Nations units were thrust southward about 12 miles by 22 May, combat elements equivalent to at least three enemy divisions were destroyed. The remainder of the attacking force was hurled back 18 miles to the 38th parallel. By 28 May, trapped enemy units were attempting to escape past the west end of the Hwachon Reservoir. In this action, the United States 2d Infantry Division and attached units including the French and Netherlands infantry battalions displayed extraordinary heroism, performing brilliantly against an enemy numerically vastly superior. Staunch resolution of these forces in face of great odds provided a major contribution to the success of United Nations forces.

In an eastward extension of the above action, three enemy divisions made a strong effort on a 12-mile front from Inje to Nodong, near the coast. In this sector, the enemy scored numerous penetrations in the United Nations lines, forcing a series of withdrawals which carried defending forces about 30 miles southward. The situation

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted to the Security Council by the acting U.S. representative to the Security Council on June 28. For texts of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh reports to the Security Council on U.N. Command operation in Korea, see BULLETIN of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43, and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. The reports which have been published separately as Department of State publications 3935, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108 respectively will appear hereafter only in the BULLETIN. The twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; the fifteenth and sixteenth reports in the BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625; the seventeenth report in the BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 710; the eighteenth in the BULLETIN of May 7, 1951, p. 755; a special report by the U.N. Commanding General, in the BULLETIN of May 21, 1951, p. 828; the nineteenth report in the BULLETIN of June 4, 1951, p. 910; the twentieth report in the BULLETIN of June 11, 1951, p. 948; and the twenty-first report in the BULLETIN of July 2, 1951, p. 30.

stabilized by 22 May, a few miles to the north of Changdong and Hajinbu. In this action, fighting was particularly intense in the vicinity of Komsan, Changdong, and Kusung. However, the enemy's calamitous losses on other parts of the front completely neutralized this temporary success, and he resisted only moderately as the United Nations counteroffensive forced him back toward the 38th parallel.

Front lines at the close of the period ran generally northeast from Munsan, along the Imjin River to Chongong, thence eastward through Hwachon to Inje, southeast to Sori, and northeast to Yongchon.

In spite of his severe losses, the enemy retains a strong potential for aggressive action, though he probably will require a minimum of several weeks to reorganize for another major effort. In addition to the 21 Chinese Communist forces and 9 north Korean divisions now in contact with United Nations Forces, there are 33 Chinese Communist forces and 14 north Korean divisions, or a total of 77 infantry divisions available to the enemy for further operations. Of the 15 Chinese Communist force divisions which undertook the main burden of the offensive, at least 8 suffered so heavily that they will require an extended period for reorganization. Though these losses constitute a serious depletion of enemy strength, they are not such as to preclude future offensive operations.

Guerrilla activities continued at a minimum during the period, and were mainly confined to foraging, and to small scale defensive actions, as United Nations Security units sought out dissident bands.

United Nations naval forces continued the constant patrol and reconnaissance operations which throughout the Korean war have so effectively denied to the enemy the use of Korean waters and assured the unrestricted movement of United Nations shipping to and from Korea.

Carrier based and Marine shore based aircraft directed the principal weight of their effort to close support of United Nations ground forces, as the enemy's renewed offensive reached its high water mark and began to recede. These operations resulted in heavy losses to the enemy.

United Nations surface units and carrier based aircraft continued a coordinated program of interdiction of enemy railroads and highways in northeastern Korea, with the naval gunfire phase of this program concentrated largely in the Wonsan-Songjin-Chongjin areas. Similar interdiction operations were conducted on the west coast, particularly in the Chinnampo area and along the Seoul-Pyongyang axis.

During the period of this report, surface units were active in providing gunfire support to United Nations ground units on the east coast of Korea.

Check minesweeping operations continued on both coasts of Korea, mainly for the protection of ships engaged in shore bombardment. Drifting mines continued to be sighted and destroyed in substantial numbers.

The heaviest night air attacks of the war were unleashed during the fortnight by United States Far East Air Force medium and light bombers ranging the entire battlefront. Employing radar techniques, the bombers have delivered hundreds of tons of explosives upon the advancing enemy masses with an accuracy comparable to that attained in visual bombing. Temporarily diverted from the role of interdiction, the bombers have imposed severe losses upon the enemy forces as they renewed their Spring offensive. Additional night sorties by light bombers and fighters concentrated upon transport attempting to sustain the enemy's drive.

Incessant daylight attacks by United States Air Force, United States Marine, and South African planes exacted huge tolls by strafing, napalming, and bombing. Ground observers advancing with counter-attacking United Nations forces report thousands upon thousands of enemy killed by air action. In one single smashing attack, 16 pilots of the 27th Fighter Wing inflicted over 700 casualties and destroyed 50 vehicles near Inje.

Airfields, supply dumps, bridges, and tunnels were repeatedly struck by all types of combat aircraft, though enemy personnel in the immediate battle zone constituted the primary target while their attack was being repulsed and the United Nations counterattack being developed successfully.

Rain and low clouds reduced the number of sorties on many days but contributed to the effectiveness of some attacks by permitting surprise attacks upon an enemy relying upon cloud cover to conceal his movements and to ground United Nations aircraft.

Reconstruction of airfields in hostile territory receives much attention, but other than at Sinuiju no effort to utilize these fields has been revealed. Pyongyang is the site of a unique attempt to develop an airfield in the center of the city by using a widened avenue as an air strip and adjacent streets as taxiways to dispersal areas and revetments.

Air conflicts were relatively few. However, in aerial combat, United Nations Air Forces are increasing their extremely favorable proportion of heavy enemy losses to negligible friendly losses.

Air lift and air drop operations by the United States 315th Air Division continued their material contribution to the success of United Nations ground successes.

Exemplifying the importance of the interdiction program to the United Nations is the tremendous effort of the north Koreans and Chinese to maintain river crossings over the Chong-Chon River one and one half miles north of Sinanju. At the time the north Korean Army invaded South Korea, the river was spanned at this point by a rail bridge and a highway bridge, each about 3,500 feet long. Preliminary work had been completed upon another rail bridge.

Other than during the freeze-over period in midwinter when the crossings have little significance as a choke point, this bridge complex has been neutralized repeatedly as United Nations air power has countered reconstruction and by-passing activities. In addition to attempted repair of the existing spans, the enemy has undertaken to maintain two temporary bridge bypasses and two ferry crossings despite repeated disruptive attacks by United Nations air.

There remains a void of reliable information concerning United Nations soldiers who have fallen into the hands of the enemy. In spite of their statements to the United Nations, the enemy has deliberately ignored the provisions of the Geneva convention, which require that a civilized nation provide for the safety of, and render reliable reports on, prisoners of war who fall into their hands. Reports which have already been submitted describe the atrocities to which captured United Nations soldiers have been subjected. The atrocities are attested by both photographs and documents in the files of the United Nations Command. The aggressors have furnished no information on United Nations prisoners to the International Committee of the Red Cross, or to any official intermediary recognized by the United Nations, except for two short incomplete lists. Instead, the enemy has consistently pursued a viciously misleading program wherein highly colored propaganda has been substituted for the official, confirmed data required by the Geneva convention. The International Red Cross has tried but has not been permitted to establish liaison with United Nations prisoners held by the Communists, or to carry out other services usually provided by the Red Cross organization.

The United Nations Command has endeavored to inform the enemy soldier in Korea of the frightful, but fruitless, sacrifice of human life caused by their Communist masters. By leaflets and loud-speaker broadcasts there is pointed out to him the opportunity to escape the Communist-created holocaust by electing surrender as an honorable alternative. United Nations radio broadcasts continue to keep the Korean people accurately informed on the course of the war.

Heavy Communist losses during the winter and spring have been followed by malicious Communist propaganda alleging that United Nations forces have resorted to bacteriological and chemical warfare. These charges are wholly groundless and manifestly absurd. But it has been definitely established that not only the enemy's armies, but also the civilian population under their domination, have suffered terrible losses to disease because of the lack of basic preventive and curative measures. By depriving the civilians of their normal food stocks, the Chinese and North Korean master have aggravated the effects of communicable disease; by providing virtually no medical care, they alone bear the guilt of wanton and inhuman neglect.

## **Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council**

The headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers: S/2171, May 28; S/2177, May 31; S/2187, June 6; S/2189, June 8; S/2190, June 11; S/2192, June 11; S/2195, June 13; S/2196, June 13; S/2198, June 15; S/2199, June 15; S/2200, June 19; S/2205, June 20; S/2206, June 20; S/2208, June 21; S/2209, June 22; S/2210, June 25; S/2214, June 27; S/2215, June 27; S/2222, June 29; S/2223, July 2; S/2224, July 2.

## **Merwin L. Bohan Named to U.S.-Brazil Joint Commission**

The Department of State announced on June 12 that the position of U. S. Member on the United States-Brazil Joint Commission for Economic Development under the Point Four Program left vacant by the sudden and unfortunate death of Francis Adams Truslow will be filled by Merwin L. Bohan until a new appointment is made by President Harry S. Truman.

The Joint Commission was established, as part of the Point Four Program, by an agreement made on December 19, 1950, between the Governments of Brazil and the United States. Mr. Truslow was named the American member and Mr. Ary Frederico Torres, prominent São Paulo businessman, the Brazilian member. Staffs of advisers to the two members are being provided by the respective Governments. It is anticipated that the Joint Commission will commence its work immediately upon the arrival in Brazil of Mr. Bohan who plans to leave for Rio de Janeiro by air shortly.

The purpose of the Joint Commission is to study the development needs of Brazil and make recommendations for development and improvement in specific fields, particularly transportation, electric power, food and agriculture, and minerals.

Mr. Bohan, U.S. Representative on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, has had many years of experience in Latin American economic development projects. He was chief of the U.S. Economic Mission to Bolivia in 1941-42 which laid out a broad economic development program which is still being followed in that country. He was appointed to the Council with the personal rank of Ambassador in March of this year.

Mr. Truslow, who resigned as President of the New York Curb Exchange and was appointed U.S. Member of the Joint Commission by the President in May of this year, died July 8 at sea while en route to Rio de Janeiro.



## The United States in the United Nations

[July 18-19, 1951]

### General Assembly

*General Assembly Resolution 500 (V)*—"Additional Measures To Be Employed To Meet The Aggression In Korea"—A report issued by the United Nations Secretariat, July 12, 1951, contains 55 communications received from governments (43 Member States and 12 non-Member States) concerning the implementation of the United Nations embargo resolution adopted May 18, 1951, against the Communist aggressors in Korea—the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the North Korean authorities.

The following 34 Members advised that they were complying fully with the resolution requirements: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. The Governments of Ecuador and Mexico advised that special consideration was being given to the matter. Burma and India, whose governments abstained from voting on the resolution, advised that the strategic items on the prohibited list were in short supply in their own countries and had to be imported from abroad, and that therefore their use was strictly controlled and re-export prohibited.

The United Nations members comprising the Soviet bloc stated that the resolution was "illegal" and therefore they would not give consideration to its recommendations. Three other satellite, non-member countries—Albania, Hungary, and Rumania—replied similarly.

Communications from the following nine non-Members stated that their governments were either giving the matter favorable consideration or were unanimously supporting the resolution: Austria, Cambodia, Finland, Germany (Federal Republic of), Italy, Jordan, Laos, Spain, and Vietnam.

The Secretariat will issue subsequent reports upon receipt of additional communications.

*United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA)*—The Department of State and the Department of Defense announced on July 18, 1951, that

an agreement has been concluded between the United States Government, acting in its capacity as Unified Command pursuant to resolutions of the United Nations, and Mr. J. Donald Kingsley, Agent General of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, governing the relationships in Korea of the United Nations Command and the UNKRA during the present phase.

While active hostilities continue, the U.N. Command will have sole responsibility for all relief and short-term economic aid essential to the military operations. The United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency will assume full responsibility for relief and rehabilitation operations when the military situation permits this responsibility to be relinquished by the United Nations Command. In the meantime UNKRA will expand its present staff in Korea to prepare for its full-scale operations, will render technical advice and assistance to the Korean Government, will plan for long-range rehabilitation and reconstruction, and will carry out any program of economic aid in addition to the program of the United Nations Command which may be found feasible. The plans and activities of the UNKRA staff will be closely coordinated with the work in the relief field of the United Nations Command.

This agreement is designed to introduce the UNKRA into the relief operation as it progresses in order to make the eventual transfer of responsibility as smooth as possible, while preserving the integrity of General Ridgway's military command during hostilities.

*Collective Measures Committee (CMC)*—The committee held its fifth meeting on July 17. The chairman, Ambassador Joao Carlos Muniz (Brazil), pointed to the current armistice negotiations in Kaesong and said that if a satisfactory agreement on Korea could be reached it would mark the first time an attempt to enforce peace by collective measures would have been achieved. At the same time, he warned that any relaxation of efforts now in the direction of collective measures would invite further aggression. He described the number of replies that had been received in connection with implementation of paragraph 8 of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution adopted by the General Assembly on November 3, 1950.

The Secretary-General on June 25 distributed to the members of the General Assembly copies of ten replies and four acknowledgments that had been received as of that date in answer to the

letter he sent to all members, April 16, 1951, at the request of the Cmc. This letter called attention to paragraphs 8 and 9 of section C of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution which states:

8. RECOMMENDS to the States Members of the United Nations that each Member maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized, and equipped that they could promptly be made available, in accordance with its constitutional processes, for service as a United Nations unit or units, upon recommendation by the Security Council or the General Assembly, without prejudice to the use of such elements in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter;

9. INVITES the Members of the United Nations to inform the Collective Measures Committee provided for in paragraph 11 as soon as possible of the measures taken in implementation of the preceding paragraph;

The communications were received from Canada, Colombia, France, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Norway, Pakistan, United Kingdom, and the United States; the acknowledgments were from China, Luxembourg, Mexico, and the Union of South Africa.

Subsequent communications have since been received by the Secretary-General from Brazil, Greece, Philippines, New Zealand, and Yugoslavia. Mr. Joseph Nisot (Belgium) and Mr. K. C. O. Shann (Australia) advised the Collective Measures Committee that replies from their Governments would be forthcoming shortly.

Canada, France, United Kingdom, and the United States replied that their respective armed forces serving under the United Nations Unified Command in Korea and their obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty were considered as fulfilling at this time the purposes of the General Assembly recommendations in the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. These countries further stated that their Governments would keep this matter under constant review in the light of changing circumstances and in furtherance of the policy of the United Nations to build up an effective collective security system. Canada stated that its unit in Korea has been established under legislation providing for a permanent Canadian force available for service under appropriate United Nations recommendations. Norway advised that in addition to the unit placed at the disposal of the NATO it has "decided to designate a unit of battalion strength as an additional Norwegian contribution to the forces at the disposal of the United Nations for collective action at the call of the General Assembly or the Security Council." New Zealand stated, "If in any future case the United Nations should again call upon Member States to make armed forces available, the New Zealand Government would make every effort to comply with such a request as they have done in the Korean case."

The Philippines advised, "The status of the contingent of Philippine armed forces now serving in Korea is subject to further consideration by the appropriate organs of the Philippine Government in accordance with the developing system of collective security under the United Nations."

Brazil noted that "it will do its utmost to maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized, and equipped that they could be made available in accordance with its constitutional processes, for service as a United Nations unit or units, . . ."

Greece stated, "The Greek Government is now in principle resolved that, even after the termination of the war in Korea, it will maintain in readiness a military force in any case not inferior to that at present serving in Korea . . . with a view to an immediate availability for service on the recommendation of the Security Council or the General Assembly."

Yugoslavia advised that because it must guard its frontiers against pressure by the Soviet Union and its satellites, it cannot earmark forces for service to the United Nations. Guatemala, Honduras, India, and Pakistan advised that they were unable to make available any armed forces to the United Nations.

Mr. Harding F. Bancroft, the United States Deputy Representative on the Collective Measures Committee proposed the establishment of a Subcommittee on Military Measures, whose task it would be to discuss methods, procedures, and arrangements which could be used by Member States for utilization of their armed forces as envisaged in section C of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. This, Mr. Bancroft stated, would ensure streamlining the procedures whereby United Nations Members could bring their strength to bear against an aggressor. The Subcommittee would deal with the collation of offers as well as with methods for coordinating military measures and general guidance for the Panel of Military Experts. The Committee also approved the composition of the Subcommittee as proposed by Mr. K. C. O. Shann (Australia), namely, Brazil, France, Philippines, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslavia. Ambassador Muniz (Brazil) to act as Chairman.

The Committee approved (13-0-1, Egypt), with a few changes, the report of the working group on the general functions of the Panel of Military Experts, and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions was directed to consider the financing aspects as broadly as possible.

**Africa**

ETHIOPIA: Point 4 Administrator Visits . . . 149

**Aid to Foreign Countries**

Agreement With India For Relief Supplies . . . 146

**American Republics**

GUATEMALA: Nursing Workshop Opened by WHO . . . 146

**Asia**

INDIA: Agreement for Relief Supplies . . . 146

**IRAN:**

Consultations on Oil Dispute . . . 129

Harriman Departs for Iran; Consultations on Oil Dispute . . . 129

Truman Message to Prime Minister . . . 129

**JAPAN:**

Draft Peace Treaty, Declarations, Text . . . 132

Exchange of Memoranda With U.S.S.R. . . . 138

Soviet Memorandum of June 10 . . . 143

U.S. Memorandum of July 9 . . . 157

**KOREA:**

Communiqués to the Security Council . . . 151

Documents on Armistice Negotiations . . . 155

U.N. Command Operation, 22d Report (May 16-31, 1951) . . . 150

SAUDI ARABIA: MDAP Agreement Signed With U.S. . . . 150

**Australia**

Security Treaty Proposed (Spender), Text . . . 147

**Communism**

Documents on Armistice Negotiations in Korea . . . 151

**Europe**

ITALY: U.S. Policy on Trieste Unchanged . . . 146

NORWAY: Signs Torquay Protocol . . . 146

SWITZERLAND: Estate Tax Convention Signed With U.S. . . . 145

**U.S.S.R.:**

Friendship Resolution Not Published . . . 144

Memoranda on Japanese Peace Treaty . . . 143

Soviet Memorandum of June 10 . . . 143

U.S. Memorandum of July 9 . . . 145

U.S. Notes on Lend-Lease Articles (July 2 and Apr. 6, 1951) . . . 145

**Health**

WHO Opens Nursing Workshop in Guatemala . . . 146

**International and Educational Exchange Program**

VOA: Broadcasts Soviet Failure To Publish Friendship Resolution . . . 144

**International Meetings**

Bohan Named To U.S.-Brazil Joint Commission . . . 157

**Mutual Aid and Defense**

MDAP Agreement Signed With Saudi Arabia . . . 150

**New Zealand**

Security Treaty Proposed (Berendsen), Text . . . 147

**Presidential Documents**

CORRESPONDENCE: Truman Message to Iranian Prime Minister (Mosadeq) . . . 129

**State, Department of**

Conducts Seminar on Foreign Affairs . . . 150

Suspension of 2 Foreign Service Officers (Clubb, Davies) . . . 150

**Taxation**

Switzerland Signs Estate Tax Convention With U.S. . . . 145

**Technical Cooperation and Development****POINT FOUR:**

Administrator Visits Ethiopia . . . 149

Plan Adopted for Use of American Science Books . . . 149

**Trade**

Norway Signs Torquay Protocol . . . 146

**Treaties and Other International Agreements**

Agreement With India for Relief Supplies . . . 146

**JAPAN:**

Draft Peace Treaty, Declarations, Text . . . 132

Soviet Memorandum of June 10 . . . 138

U.S. Memorandum of July 9 . . . 143

NORWAY: Signs Torquay Protocol . . . 146

Proposed Security Treaty With Australia, New Zealand . . . 147

SWITZERLAND: Signs Estate Tax Convention With U.S. . . . 145

U.S.S.R.: U.S. Notes on Lend-Lease Articles (July 2 and Apr. 6, 1951) . . . 145

**United Nations**

Command Operations in Korea (May 16-31, 1951) . . . 155

Documents on Armistice Negotiations in Korea . . . 151

U.S. in U.N. (Weekly Summary) . . . 158

WHO: Opens Nursing Workshop in Guatemala . . . 146

**Name Index**

Acheson, Secretary Dean . . . 123, 145, 146  
 Bennett, Henry G. . . . 149  
 Berendsen, Carl . . . 148  
 Bohan, Merwin L. . . . 157  
 Bruggmann, Charles . . . 145  
 Clubb, Oliver E. . . . 150  
 Davies, John P., Jr. . . . 150  
 Dulles, John Foster . . . 132, 147  
 Harriman, W. Averell . . . 129  
 Joy, Vice Admiral . . . 151  
 Karavaev, Boris I. . . . 145  
 Kim Il Sung (Gen.) . . . 154  
 Lie, Secretary-General Trygve . . . 157  
 Mosadeq, Mohammed . . . 129  
 McDermott, Michael J. . . . 131  
 McGhee, George C. . . . 129  
 Nam Il (Gen.) . . . 151  
 Pandit, Mme. Vijaya L. . . . 146  
 Peng Teh-Hual . . . 151  
 Ridgway, Gen. Matthew B. . . . 151  
 Spender, Percy C. . . . 147  
 Truman, President Harry S. . . . 129, 144